This Chapter Is Especially Useful For:
Guiding Principles related to the Social Dimension of Housing Reconstruction
Pre-disaster housing conditions vary widely, from luxurious to ramshackle, but no type of housing is immune to the effects of disasters. In addition, in a post-disaster environment, households have different kinds and levels of resources to rely on for rebuilding; some can rebuild solely with their own resources, while others are totally dependent on government assistance. It may also be beneficial in a post-disaster environment for government to provide assistance to households that weren’t even affected by the disaster.
When post-disaster housing assistance is being allocated, policy makers have to address the following critical questions[1]:
These questions have no “right” answer. While all post-disaster housing assistance is intended to help recipients solve disaster-related housing problems, the approach must be fine-tuned to the circumstances, culture, and available resources. This chapter provides guidance on the factors to consider in making these decisions and discusses some of the consequences. The discussion is focused principally on assistance to help return housing to a safe and livable condition and is meant to address the needs of the affected population, in all tenancy categories, as shown below.
Public Policies Related to Housing Assistance and Beneficiary Eligibility
Few public agencies have policies on how to allocate and distribute post-disaster housing assistance. If they do, they will have to be adjusted to the particularities of the emergency at hand. However, there may be existing financial assistance programs related to housing and community development (such as down-payment assistance, low-interest loans, or ongoing community revitalization programs). These programs may have data on families that can be used to facilitate the qualification process. Or an administrative system that includes identification numbers may be in place that can be adapted to the reconstruction program. If other subsidy programs are already operating, public agencies should calibrate the level of assistance and qualification rules so that the housing assistance program is seen as fair and consistent with existing public policies (not providing disaster assistance in excess of other programs that seek to accomplish a similar goal). The agencies should also be prepared to explain publicly how the terms of the disaster program and other housing assistance programs relate.[2]
Specific laws may apply when the housing assistance is offered to an owner by government in exchange for the property, for instance, to acquire a house in a high-risk area so that the residents relocate. If the owner objects to government taking the property, and government can argue that the property is being taken for a public purpose (risk reduction, in this case), eminent domain law may be applied.[3] Governments will ordinarily avoid using eminent domain in a post-disaster situation because of the time and cost involved. Whether taken by eminent domain or another procedure, local law may stipulate the basis for the housing assistance, usually that the owner is “justly compensated” (often, paid fair market value) for his or her loss. Calculating the assistance on the basis of lost value, however, may not be equitable or politically palatable, since the wealthiest will receive the most assistance.
Post-disaster housing assistance by government is an example of a public arrangement for social protection or social risk management. Social risk management arrangements are generally categorized as follows: (1) informal arrangements, such as sale of personal assets or community self-help; (2) market-based arrangements, such as property insurance; and (3) public arrangements, such as assistance grants or other social safety nets. All families will use informal arrangements in their recovery and reconstruction, but they are unlikely to be sufficient. Only a select group will generally have access to market-based arrangements. The expectation after a disaster is that public arrangements, in this case housing assistance, will fill the gap that remains when informal arrangements and market-based arrangements are inadequate.[4] See Annex 1, How to Do It: Considerations in Designing a Social Protection System for Natural Disasters.
Government as Insurer
In many countries, government acts as the principal insurer of housing after a disaster. This is common when there is an inadequate property insurance system, an insurance market that is unaffordable to some households, no sanctions against being uninsured or underinsured, or disaster damage exceeds whatever insurance coverage people may have had. But when government plays this role, the “insurance terms” are not defined until after the disaster, which creates uncertainty for those affected, and the expectation that government will provide assistance creates political and economic burdens for government.
The assistance policy after one disaster will be interpreted as a signal to property owners about what government will do in future disasters, but these interpretations may be incorrect, or government policy may change over time. Eventually, government may decide that the “moral hazard” created by repeatedly providing reconstruction funds is too great and that alternatives must be sought. Creating a private insurance market and requiring homeowners to participate is one step in the process of removing government from the role of insurer. Also important are land use restrictions that forbid the occupancy of high-risk areas. There may be situations when government decides not to provide housing assistance after a disaster; for instance, when homeowners have the opportunity to insure their property and do not do it, or have knowingly chosen to live in high-risk areas over other options available to them. These policies should be defined before a disaster so that people have the opportunity to adjust their decision making. But the policy option of not providing assistance at all—or only for some part of the affected population (having an income cutoff, for example, as discussed below)—is one that should be evaluated even after the disaster. Reconstruction as Opportunity to Resolve Long-Standing Problems
As part of reconstruction policy, government must decide the degree to which reconstruction will be used to accomplish longer-term development objectives. A disaster is often viewed as an opportunity to resolve long-standing development shortcomings, and, with a significant inflow of external assistance, the potential for correcting inadequacies in pre-disaster housing and community services obviously increases. It is clearly sound policy to rebuild houses and infrastructure that is less vulnerable to future disasters (‘‘built back better”). A more complex decision in development terms is whether to move disaster-affected communities “to the “head of the line” of all those waiting to have their basic needs met (e.g., providing sewerage systems or updated road configurations), thereby favoring affected communities with a standard of living higher than that in similar, but unaffected, communities. The savings of taking a comprehensive approach to reconstruction may justify it, even at the risk of political fallout. An example of when the reconstruction period was used as a time to address the vulnerabilities of undamaged housing is discussed in the case study on the Gujarat reconstruction policy in Chapter 2, Assessing Damage and Setting Reconstruction Policy. It explains how strengthening of housing not damaged by the disaster was defined in the reconstruction policy as an integral part of the reconstruction effort.
Reconstruction as Social Policy
A post-disaster housing assistance program will raise questions of equity, both among those affected and between the affected group and unaffected households with similar needs. Poor and vulnerable households are likely to need a disproportionate level of assistance after a disaster because they are otherwise less able to rebuild or reestablish their livelihoods, but they may not receive it. Assistance is likely to arrive from numerous sources—private, public, and official, national and international—and to be channeled through a range of entities. Each organization may define housing needs or rights differently, and an organization’s imperative to establish a foothold in the disaster location can produce unexpected and inequitable outcomes. Government has the right and responsibility to ensure a consistent and equitable allocation of the available resources. The challenge of doing so effectively increases with the number of agencies involved. A useful tool to reach a common understanding of the social impacts of the disaster is social assessment. Annex 2 of this chapter contains a step-by-step explanation of how to conduct a social assessment.
Choice of Criteria
The task of allocating housing assistance can have unintended consequences when applied in real-world situations. Applying criteria in a logical manner is not easy, and the reality of limited resources further complicates the task. Government should develop an assistance strategy that selects among and weights these (and perhaps other) criteria in a way that reflects both governmental objectives and social values. Arriving at the proper solution is likely to be an iterative process. Government should consult with the public, especially the affected communities, on the appropriate assistance policy. Once decided, it should be announced publicly and applied objectively. Government should also monitor and publicize the results of the policy and be willing to make any needed adjustments.
The tables below contain some housing-related questions that are commonly asked during the process of developing a disaster housing assistance strategy, some issues that should be taken into consideration in responding to those questions, and some recommendations on how to proceed. Who Is Entitled?
What Type of Housing Solution Are People Entitled To?
The questions regarding “type of housing solution” and “amount of assistance” are closely related. The former address issues related to the physical result being sought; the latter address issues related to the resources needed to accomplish the physical result. Neither is related to the reconstruction approach; almost any type of solution can be provided using a range of reconstruction approaches.
What Amount of Housing Assistance Should Be Provided?
Quantifying the amount of assistance may be the policy issue that concerns decision makers even more than what result will come of it. The factors above, such as the types of solutions sought, influence the level of assistance. Below are other critical questions.
Additional Considerations
Poverty and vulnerability. People’s capacity to recover from a disaster depends on their socioeconomic status. The majority of the poor are women and children who may be isolated socially and who may have less access to physical, financial, and social capital. Members of vulnerable groups and the poor may not incur high losses in absolute terms simply because they own less, but they tend to be the most severely affected by disasters. These households often do not own the land or shelter they occupy. And their dwellings may be weaker and located in more vulnerable sites. In addition, if the house or land belonged to a husband or brother who has died in the disaster, women may be at risk of displacement and destitution. These issues need to be taken into consideration in designing assistance strategies. The vulnerability of households may be related to the loss of livelihood. The case study on reconstruction following the 1993 Maharashtra earthquake, below, explains how the priority of preserving employment in the affected villages resulted in a decision to provide more assistance to larger land owners.
Family size and composition. Housing requirements are a function of, among other things, family size and composition. These characteristics change with time and vary among societies. For instance, an assistance strategy that ignores the requirements of extended families can weaken family ties that support livelihoods and that serve as informal social security systems. This is one problem with providing overly standardized housing solutions that are difficult to customize later. Conditions on assistance. Government may decide to tie housing assistance to a requirement to comply with some condition that accomplishes a public purpose. The most common example is the requirement that the recipient improve the disaster resilience of the reconstructed house (“building back better”). Requirements could also address the reduction of environmental impact, improvement of fire safety, compliance with universal design standards for handicap accessibility in a multi-family building, co-ownership by a couple, or conformance with architectural guidelines in a historic district. Any of these conditions may be reasonable, depending on the circumstances. Governments that condition assistance in this way must have adequate controls to ensure compliance and even-handedness in the application of the requirement. Land and housing tenure. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) recognizes six tenancy categories, shown in the Introduction section of this chapter.[5] In fact, the number of categories is much larger in some places. Rural households usually own the house they occupy and have tenure security through formal land titles or customary land rights. Urban and rural residents in the same country may have different tenure and occupancy options. Owners of housing may not own their land. In many reconstruction programs, only homeowners with clear title to their land have been entitled to housing assistance. Those designing housing assistance strategies should make sure they understand all the categories of tenancy relevant to the affected population and craft an assistance program that considers them all. The United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT) identified 31 different tenancy situations in the affected population in Peru following the 2007 Ica/Pisco earthquake.[6] Chapter 7, Land Use and Physical Planning, contains a section on resolving land tenure issues in reconstruction. Gender issues. Generally, women spend more time in their homes than men do, and they have clearer ideas about what they need. Yet women often do not participate in public consultations or express their views in the presence of men, which can lead to errors in developing the assistance strategy. (This may be particularly true of female-headed households.) Best practice would be to place special emphasis on the particular post-disaster situation of women and to organize separate women-only community consultations. Among the gender-related housing issues to consider in housing reconstruction are (1) legal (the differential legal status of women), (2) economic (women’s low economic status and the prevalence of women’s home-based enterprises), (3) security (safety issues related to housing and access to services and markets), and (4) social (children’s access to schools). Disaster-induced mortality and migration. If a disaster causes high rates of mortality or migration, it may not make sense to estimate housing requirements based on a pre-disaster census or to adopt a house-for-house assistance policy. More time and professional support may be required before an appropriate housing assistance policy can be defined. The importance of social assessments. While the damage and loss assessment estimates physical damages and needs for reconstruction, a social analysis is required to understand the social dimension of housing and to design the assistance policy. The social analysis should include consultations with stakeholders and affected communities. The World Bank has experience and resources that provide conceptual and methodological guidance on conducting social analysis, as well as e-learning courses. Although none of these tools focuses specifically on social analysis in relation to disasters, they can be adapted for this purpose.[7] Annex 2 to this chapter contains a step-by-step explanation of how to conduct a social assessment.
Examples of Recent Housing Assistance Schemes
Source: Pakistan Earthquake Recovery and Reconstruction Agency, 2007, “Global Post-Disaster Housing Reconstruction Comparative Analysis,” http://www.erra.pk/. (See full table in Part 4, Technical References, Matrix of Disaster Project Features.)
2006 Typhoon Durian, Bicol, Philippines
Targeting during Post-Typhoon Reconstruction
Typhoon Durian hit the Philippines in November 2006, just when the country—especially the Bicol Region in the Luzon Island group—was recovering from a previous typhoon and from the eruption of the Mayon volcano. Durian, categorized as a super typhoon, caused mudslides, floods, and powerful winds that affected almost 650,000 households, displaced more than 19,000 households, and damaged approximately 540,000 houses, of which 214,000 were destroyed. Some 2,360 people were reported injured and 720 deaths were confirmed. Coordinating with government and municipalities, the nongovernmental organization Community Organization of the Philippine Enterprise Foundation (COPE) decided to focus on relocation and construction of permanent shelter in Daraga and Legazpi City, two cities that were heavily affected by the typhoon. The multiple-step targeting process was designed to identify the poorest of the poor, using information from community associations and local government units. The criteria targeted people without access to any financial assistance for reconstruction, single parents or widows with at least four dependents, vulnerable individuals (orphaned, disabled, or ill), and poor families that had lost their major source of income. Home visits were carried out to validate beneficiary information provided by local governments. Focus groups were held to discuss relocation. Psychosocial therapy was provided to help the families overcome the disaster experience and prepare for reconstruction and relocation. To be selected, beneficiaries had to commit to provide counterpart labor during construction (the value of the labor ranged from US$60 to US$151). During the construction process, constraints included the unavailability of land for permanent shelter close to the original settlement and the constantly increasing prices due to high rates of inflation. Despite these problems, COPE provided 170 typhoon-resilient permanent housing units to the selected families. Sources: Government of the Philippines, 2006, “Philippines: NDCC media update –Typhoon ‘Reming’ (Durian), December 13, 2006,” http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/EKOI-6WF8T8?OpenDocument&rc=3&emid=TC-2006-000175-PHL; and Myrna Abella-Llanes and Salve Alemania-Cadag, 2006, “Housing & Community Reconstruction, Bikol Super Typhoon” (COPE Foundation Case Study, unpublished). 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, Tamil Nadu, India
Identifying Eligible Families in an Urban Setting
Tamil Nadu was one of the Indian states most affected by the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. While a number of agencies were involved in the provision of temporary housing and in reconstruction in Chennai, it was principally the Tamil Nadu Slum Clearance Board (TNSCB) that worked with the fisher community. The city of Chennai had an ongoing initiative, funded by the World Bank, to replace slums with tenement housing and therefore had procedures in place that were helpful in planning the apartments required by the community. The key challenges for the TNSCB were (1) getting the fishers to concur with the design of houses, and (2) developing the list of eligible families. Because the houses were to be given away, many ineligible people tried to be declared eligible (including one person who claimed ownership of 32 structures!). Approximately 11,000 people claimed to be the owners of the 6,000 properties slated for replacement. However, the fishers resisted participating in the field survey that would validate their claims; the survey teams faced physical assault and required a police escort. When eventually the TNSCB completed the field enumeration, each family was surveyed and photographed in front of its property. The TNSCB used an eligibility matrix to award points for current residency on site, residency immediately after the tsunami, and documentary proof of residence (current and immediately after the tsunami). No family could receive more than one housing unit. Based on the scoring, an eligibility list was finalized and presented to the families for their review. Because of the transparent manner in which the survey was conducted, development of the eligibility list—a daunting task—was eventually accomplished and approved by all stakeholders. Although this process delayed the start of reconstruction by more than two years, it produced a detailed tool that could be used to streamline the eligibility process in future disasters.
Source: C. V. Sankar, India National Disaster Management Authority, 2009, personal communication.
Different states in India have adopted entirely different housing assistance policies, each of which reflects an interpretation of an affected community’s socioeconomic conditions and housing needs. The case studies below show how housing assistance policies can exacerbate existing socioeconomic inequalities. 1993 Maharashtra Earthquake, India
Pre-Disaster Landholding as Basis for Assistance in Maharashtra
The 1993 Maharashtra earthquake caused damage in 728 villages, 37 of which were completely destroyed; the collapse of 25,000 houses; and damage to another 200,000 houses. A reconstruction program was executed, largely with resources from the US$221 million World Bank loan—the Maharashtra Emergency Earthquake Rehabilitation Project. The affected villages were divided into three damage categories. Category B villages (22 villages, 10,000 houses) received financial assistance for reconstruction in-situ. Work was stalled in some cases while people lobbied for relocation. Construction and land purchases for these villages were done largely by nongovernmental organizations. Investment in amenities was modest, but satisfaction levels were high. Category C villages (180,000 houses) used owner-driven reconstruction for repair and retrofitting damaged houses, with materials distribution and extensive supervision. The work in these villages started late, but went more quickly than the others. Satisfaction levels were high. Cash assistance to beneficiaries in Categories B and C were uniform: Rs 62,000 (US$2,000) for reconstruction, and Rs 17,000 (US$548) and Rs 34,500 (US$1,113) for repairs, depending on the level of damage. The more complex situation had to do with certain villages that were classified as Category A (52 villages, 28,000 houses), including the Latur villages in Killari. In these villages, houses were relocated and full reconstruction took place. For the Category A beneficiaries, the size of the plots and new houses varied, depending on the original landholdings of the beneficiary. Landless and marginal landholders got a plot of 1,575 sq. ft. and 250 sq. ft. houses. Households owning between 1 and 7 hectares of land got 2,500 sq. ft. plots and 400 sq. ft. houses. Farmers owning more than 7 hectares of land got 5,000 sq. ft. plots and 750 sq. ft. houses. As a result, wealthier households benefitted more than poor households, regardless of their own endowments or requirements. The justification for this approach had to do with the characteristics of the local economy. The Latur village economy in Killari consisted of a few large Patils who owned major land holdings and lived in the village center in large stone, mud, and wooden frame gaddis. Some had up to 1-acre plots with sprawling structures. Landless dalits who provided farm labor lived on marginal land in mud and thatch huts. However, the gaddis were not only residences, they were effectively agro-processing centers. On these properties, many productive activities took place: produce of the farms was stored, cattle was milked, sugar cane was converted into jaggery, fodder was dried, and grapes were converted into resins. As a result, dozens of landless workers were employed on the gaddis. Originally, the decision was made to give everyone equal housing assistance after the earthquake. But the Patil owners refused to accept this solution, saying that they would move their dwellings out of the village to large farm plots. If they had done so, it would have destroyed the village economy, because each large house employed dozens of landless workers. To find employment, the landless workers would then move to the city or have to move onto the Patil properties. The land owners argued that they lost the most and that to continue to live in the village they needed large houses to store and process the farm produce. Contractors were hired for all work, and amenities, including infrastructure, were extensive. There was limited community participation, which reduced the level of beneficiary satisfaction. Landless dwellers in small huts, mostly squatters with uncertain titles, not damaged by the earthquake, received fixed houses of 250 sq. ft. on 1,500 sq. ft. plots with full ownership titles. The large gaddi owners received up to 5,000 sq. ft. plots, which were nearly half or one-third of their original household plots. Thus, the gaddi owners had less than what they had before, but, by remaining in the villages, they enabled agro-processing to subsist on, and the landless (who now owned small plots) retained their livelihood. If the large land owners moved to their individual farm lands, the landless small house owners would not have been able to stay in the village as there would have been no employment. The lesson from this experience, according to those involved, is that post disaster reconstruction can improve the lot of many, but cannot resolve all pre-disaster social inequities. Sources: World Bank, Maharashtra Emergency Earthquake Rehabilitation Project, http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?pagePK=64283627&piPK=73230&theSitePK=40941&menuPK=228424&Projectid=P034162; “Latur District 1993 Earthquake,” http://latur.nic.in/html/earthquake.htm; and Praveen Pardeshi, 2009, written communication.
1999 Orissa Super Cyclone, India
Beneficiary Assistance Varies by Poverty Level
The “super cyclone” that hit Orissa, India, in September 1999, affected 13 million people, killed nearly 10,000, and destroyed some 800,000 houses. Immediately after the disaster, all affected people received a minor grant. No comprehensive governmental reconstruction program was organized. Instead, government provided two types of housing assistance: free housing to 200,000 poor families through the Indira Awas Yojana, an ongoing social housing program targeting the scheduled castes and tribes and households below the poverty line, and loans to 175,000 families above the poverty line through the Housing and Urban Development Corporation. This policy reflected a recognition that the type of assistance provided to better-off households who could afford to repay the cost to rebuild should be different from the assistance provided to poor families. Source: Commissionerate of Rural Development, Gujarat, “Indira Awas Yojana,” http://www.ruraldev.gujarat.gov.in/iay.html 2001 Gujarat Earthquake, India
Funds Allocated According to Damage Level
The earthquake in the state of Gujarat, India, destroyed 344,000 houses and damaged another 888,000. Using World Bank funds from the Gujarat Emergency Earthquake Reconstruction Project, government offered financial, material, and technical support to all affected families based on the type of house they owned and the level of damage incurred. Families with completely destroyed kuchcha house (built with low-cost materials, such as mud and thatch) received a maximum grant of Rs 30,000 (US$630). Families with a completely destroyed pukka house (built with industrial materials, such as bricks and cement) received a maximum assistance of Rs 90,000 (US$1,900). While poor people received less assistance than rich people, the minimum assistance was sufficient to replace a kuchcha house with a higher-standard house; however, the maximum grant was not sufficient to replace houses of higher-income people. The housing rights of the homeless and tenants were also recognized. Source: Jennifer Duyne Barenstein, 2009, “Who Governs Reconstruction? Changes and Continuity in Policies, Practices and Outcomes,” in Rebuilding after Disasters: From Emergency to Sustainability, G. Lizarralde, C. Johnson, and C. Davidson, eds. (London: Taylor and Francis).
Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions. 1993. Bibliography on Housing Rights and Evictions. Utrecht, Netherlands: Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions. http://www.cohre.org/store/attachments/COHRE%20Sources%202.pdf
Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions. n.d. The Pinheiro Principles: United Nations Principles for Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons. Geneva: COHRE.http://www.cohre.org/store/attachments/Pinheiro%20Principles.pdf. Holzmann, Robert, Lynne Sherburne-Benz, and Emil Tesliuc, 2003, The World Bank’s Approach to Social Protection in a Globalizing World (Washington, D.C.: World Bank), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOCIALPROTECTION/Publications/20847129/SRMWBApproachtoSP.pdf. Skoufias, E. 2003. “Economic Crisis and Natural Disasters: Coping Strategies and Policy Implications.” World Development 31/7: 1087–1102. http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/78330/3rd%20Workshop/Srmafrica/paristwo/pdf/readings/weather.pdf United Nations. 2008. Transitional Settlement and Reconstruction after Natural Disasters. Field Edition. UN OCHA: Geneva. http://www.sheltercentre.org/library/Transitional+settlement+and+reconstruction+after+natural+ disasters. UN OHCHR. The Human Right to Adequate Housing. Fact Sheet No. 21. Geneva: United Nations. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet21en.pdf. World Bank. 2003. Social Analysis Sourcebook: Incorporating Social Dimensions into Bank-Supported Projects. Washington, DC: World Bank. http://go.worldbank.org/HRXPCILR30. World Bank. 2003. A User’s Guide to Poverty and Social Impact Analysis. Washington, DC: World Bank. http://go.worldbank.org/IR9SLBWTQ0. World Bank. 2009. “Social Analysis at the World Bank.” http://go.worldbank.org/UDVDOCK3X0.
Natural disasters are external shocks that can have a major impact on the social and economic welfare of populations and households. Social risk management (SRM) refers to the use of a range of social protection mechanisms to prevent and mitigate risk (ex-ante strategy) or cope with its impacts after a shock such as a disaster has occurred (ex-post coping strategy). In the context of poverty reduction, SRM is a set of tools that improve the management of vulnerability by households, and may even lead to poverty reduction. The focus of SRM in the post-disaster context is on restoring and rebuilding both assets and livelihoods of households and affected communities.
Social safety nets are a type of program within the broader range of social protection. Social safety nets generally refer to non-contributory transfers (in cash or in kind), targeted at both populations at risk of economic destitution and the permanently poor, designed to keep their income above a specified minimum. In a post-disaster situation, social safety nets are almost always publicly funded transfers that help households avoid irreversible losses and decline into poverty by providing basic income and employment support. Social safety net support is often accompanied by other public or private resources provided for reconstruction and recovery. (Other instruments of social protection and social policy include mechanisms as wide-ranging as labor market policies or pension schemes. None of these other mechanisms is addressed in this annex.) This annex presents some of the issues to consider in designing a disaster-related social safety net program. While social protection and livelihood support have been considered an important part of post-disaster response for years, there has been little ex-ante planning of these disaster interventions by government. Yet planning ahead to anticipate post-disaster demands has significant benefits, since trying to create an effective social safety net program from scratch immediately after a disaster is virtually impossible. At least four months is needed to design a quality social safety net program; the special challenges that arise in the aftermath of a disaster may require additional time. The World Bank can provide extensive technical and financial assistance to governments on designing social protection systems.[8] The two best options for putting a post-disaster social safety net system in place are to adapt a system that is already operating or to create a system to provide a short-term response while simultaneously designing a better system to be implemented in the medium term. Options for Implementing Safety Nets in the Context of a Disaster
Balancing Speed and Design Quality
It is crucial to evaluate the disaster impact on households while also considering pre-existing vulnerabilities. The impacts of a natural disaster are not uniformly distributed within a population, and the effects on different people—and on their ability to cope—are strongly correlated with their pre-disaster situation. The social protection response depends on the relative intensity of those impacts and needs. At the same time, disasters affect entire communities and tend to destroy the informal safety nets and personal arrangements that traditionally provide “insurance” for poorer households.[11]Since protection is a function of vulnerability, targeted programs are preferable to untargeted ones. The design process should include considerations of equity, cost-effectiveness, incentive compatibility, and sustainability.
Social Safety Net Program Options
Social safety net programs can be carried out (1) to support immediate household and livelihood needs following a disaster, (2) as part of a scheme to facilitate housing and community reconstruction, or (3) to provide a combination of the two types of support. The forms of assistance that can be provided are similar in the three cases. Because this handbook focuses on reconstruction, this annex is intended to complement the rest of the handbook by explaining the options for immediate support.
A detailed discussion of criteria to be used in allocating reconstruction assistance is provided above in this chapter. For a discussion of the options for mobilizing and delivering financial resources and other assistance to support reconstruction, see Chapter 15, Mobilizing Financial Resources and Other Reconstruction Assistance. The tables below summarizes the three principle safety net options for providing immediate support to sustain household and livelihoods following a disaster and some considerations to take into account when choosing among them. Cash and Near-Cash Transfers
Experience with cash transfer: After the South Asia earthquake in 2005, the government of Pakistan allocated a monthly cash grant of US$50 to each eligible household. The amount was established based on a calculation of needs for an average household of seven persons. A policy decision was made by government that the payment would be uniform for all beneficiary households and would continue for six months.[17]
Experiences with in-kind assistance: After Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar in 2008, people monetized some of the in-kind assistance given to them through exchange or sale.[18] During the 1998 Bangladesh floods, in-kind food relief operations were aimed at increasing nutrition levels and avoiding starvation of targeted groups. Experiences with public works: In Indonesia, some 18,000 participants were involved in public works programs in approximately 60 villages after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. Following the 2001 earthquakes in El Salvador, Catholic Relief Services and Caritas ran a 2-year program in which communities were organized to build 1,300 houses as well as schools, health centers, and roads in exchange for food.[19]
The implementation of any post-disaster reconstruction project can have technical, physical, environmental, economic, or social impacts. Some of the impacts are desired and planned, others are unforeseen. These impacts may become obvious immediately during the project implementation or show up months or even years later. While the technical and environmental impacts of projects have long been analyzed in detail during project preparation, only since the 1990s have international organizations such as the World Bank used social assessment (SA) to systematically analyze and adjust for the potential social impacts of projects.[20] Project outcomes improve when potential risks from social impacts are analyzed early while projects are still being designed and the findings are used to fine-tune project design. SA helps all involved understand the social and economic context, incorporate the perspectives and interests of those whom the project is intended to assist, anticipate the project’s social impacts (both positive and negative), and prepare to mitigate them, when necessary.
Objectives of the Social Assessment
The general objective of SA is to improve the long-term social development outcomes of post-disaster reconstruction policies, programs, or projects by analyzing and managing their social impacts and by mitigating risks.
The specific objectives are to (1) analyze the contextual factors of a particular project or sector policy and information on how these socio-cultural, institutional, historical, economic, and political factors may influence development outcomes; (2) identify the project’s social impacts on all relevant stakeholders, including beneficiaries and other populations affected, and their corresponding strengths, vulnerabilities, and risks; (3) analyze implementing institutions and the institutional framework; (4) identify opportunities and specific constraints the project may encounter; and (5) make concrete recommendations of actions that will mitigate any adverse social impacts or improve social outcomes during implementation and monitoring of the project or policy. The process of social assessment can itself enhance project equity and strengthen social inclusion and cohesion, by facilitating the participation of relevant stakeholders, including the poor and socially excluded, in project analysis, design, and/or implementation. Methodology for Preparing a Social Assessment
The success of SA depends on the ability and capacity of the expert team to capture the multiple dimensions of the community social reality and to use this information to estimate social impacts and possible mitigation measures. It is fundamental that the team have sufficient experience in both the qualitative and quantitative aspects of social analysis, ideally in a post-disaster or similarly volatile context, and is comfortable working under time pressure. Below is a list of recommendations for conducing SA.
Sources of Information
SA is not a single method but can incorporate various approaches and tools to obtain, verify, and analyze data. Validating data in the post-disaster situation may be a challenge but should not be neglected. Data-gathering issues include the following.
Scope of the Social Assessment
After reaching agreement on the principal objectives and methodology, the consultants should familiarize themselves with the most current version of the post-disaster reconstruction policy, program, or project under consideration, if one has already been proposed, or otherwise with the broad goals of the reconstruction program. Based on this, the team will gather and analyze information on (1) the socio-cultural, institutional, historical, and political context where the project takes place; (2), the legal and regulatory context; and (3) the key social issues, including economic factors and income distribution, diversity and gender, the roles and behavior of community groups and affected stakeholders, the types of social participation, and any potential social risks. A detailed list of topics to be analyzed is shown in the table below. The relative weighting of these issues in the analysis depends on the project being considered and the context.
Further Guidance on the Social Assessment
Institutions, roles, and behavior. This component of the analysis should consider both formal and informal institutions, the political and administrative apparatus, and “rules of the game” at various levels of government, as well as the influence of private sector institutions, community, kin, and solidarity rules. Macro-institutional issues may also be relevant to the project, as well as an analysis of obstacles to equitable access to and benefit from institutions and their resources. The reasons for exclusions can include local customs, intergroup relations, formal and customary laws, or information and communication systems, and may be intentional or unintentional.
Social and economic diversity and gender. The information and analysis presented should be disaggregated by gender and income level, and vulnerabilities and their causes for each group should be identified. A special focus should be put on social equity impacts and on the distribution of impacts across the different identified social groups. Quantitative analysis should be accompanied by confidence intervals and significance levels. The following concepts should be kept in mind.
Stakeholders. The stakeholder analysis should include the characteristics, interests, incentives, and mode of influence over the project, particularly elements that adversely affect the allocation of resources and control over the quality of design and implementation. Note that the degree of organization often affects the degree of visibility and the ability of groups to express and defend their interests. Vulnerable social groups are often not organized and for this reason need more support to be heard and included. Participation. The development of communication strategies to share information and ensure the continuous flow of information contributes to participation. See Chapter 3, Communication in Post-Disaster Reconstruction. Beside a communication strategy that reaches all stakeholders, the skills of vulnerable and marginalized groups may need to be enhanced to ensure their participation in the project. Procedures to involve stakeholders in monitoring and evaluation are important. Be aware that participation, while a fundamental element for project planning, implementation, and evaluation, does not guarantee the desired results. Social risks and vulnerability. Make sure that the particularly vulnerable groups are identified, defining vulnerability beyond the traditional so that is includes groups that are socially stigmatized (such as battered women) or marginalized (people infected with HIV or suffering from AIDS). The analysis should examine the nature and roots of these vulnerabilities in the context of socioeconomic trends in the country or region.
Presentation of Findings and Recommendations
For each topic in the table above (and others the consultants may identify during the assessment), the consultants should provide a systematic summary of (1) their findings as they relate to the housing reconstruction policy, program, or project under consideration; and (2) the significant corresponding social impacts they have identified. The team should present short- and medium-term recommendations for improving the social outcomes or mitigating any adverse social impacts of the project. The recommendations should be grouped in the way that the consultants believe will make them the most understandable during the review process and, in the final report, most useful for implementation. After an initial review by the technical committee and other stakeholders, as directed by the technical committee, the recommendations should be presented in a final report as a work plan that identifies both the sequence of activities and the party or parties responsible for carrying them out, focusing particularly on modifications in project design or social risk mitigation activities.
Expected Results and Outputs of the Social Assessment
The principal output is an in-depth SA for the policy, program, or project that will permit government and/or other agencies to mitigate any adverse social impacts or improve social outcomes by making adjustments in project design and designing a system for project monitoring. In the initial report, the consultants will present a strategy, plan, and schedulefor the consultancy. The assessment itself should be presented in draft and final forms.
Time will usually be of the essence in carrying out this consultancy. The following schedule allows an SA to be completed in approximately 2 months. The following time intervals are ambitious, and, if necessary, can be adjusted, depending on the particular situation. Outputs will include:
The draft and final reports should be presented along with an executive summary or abbreviated version that can be widely circulated, in language(s) and a format that stakeholders can easily understand. An effective review process will help guarantee the acceptance of the SA, and the consultants should take an active role in carrying it out, with assistance from government and the sponsor of the assessment. This may entail various meetings with government, the community, and other stakeholders; use of information technology; and/or other means to ensure wide distribution of the draft report and collection of feedback. Meetings may also be required once the report is finalized, to more widely disseminate the findings and recommendations.
[1]. A discussion of the delivery of housing assistance is found in Chapter 15, Mobilizing Financial Resources and Other Reconstruction Assistance. [2]. For an example of an existing program whose criteria were adapted to provide assistance for post-tsunami reconstruction in Orissa, India, see the Indira Awas Yojana housing program of the Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India, http://rural.nic.in/iaygd2.htm. [3]. Eminent domain (United States), compulsory purchase (United Kingdom, New Zealand, Ireland), resumption/compulsory acquisition (Australia) or expropriation (South Africa and Canada) is the inherent power of the state to seize or expropriate property or seize rights in property, with due monetary compensation, but without the owner’s consent. The property is taken to devote it to public or civic use. Source: Wikipedia, “eminent domain,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eminent_domain. [4]. Robert Holzmann, Lynne Sherburne-Benz, and Emil Tesliuc, 2003, The World Bank’s Approach to Social Protection in a Globalizing World (Washington, D.C.: World Bank), siteresources.worldbank.org/SOCIALPROTECTION/Publications/20847129/SRMWBApproachtoSP.pdf http://www.sheltercentre.org/library/Transitional+settlement+and+reconst... disasters" name="_edn5">[5]. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) and Shelter Centre, 2010, Shelter After Disaster: Strategies for Transitional Settlement and Reconstruction (Geneva: UN OCHA). http://www.sheltercentre.org/library/Shelter+After+Disasterhttp://www.sheltercentre.org/library/Transitional+settlement+and+reconstruction+after+natural+ disasters [6]. Department for International Development and the Ministry of Housing, Construction and Sanitation, 2008, “Final Report, Land Ownership and Housing” (“Informe Final, Tenencia de la Tierra y la Vivienda”). [7]. World Bank, 2003, Social Analysis Sourcebook: Incorporating Social Dimensions into Bank-Supported Projects (Washington, DC: World Bank), http://go.worldbank.org/HRXPCILR30. [8]. World Bank, “Safety Nets and Transfers,” http://go.worldbank.org/IFOHJJAPD0 and Margaret E. Grosh et al.,2008, For Protection & Promotion: The Design and Implementation of Effective Safety Nets (Washington, DC: World Bank), http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/WBI/WBIPROGRAMS/SPLP/0,,contentMDK:21956122~menuPK:461694~pagePK:64156158~piPK:64152884~theSitePK:461654,00.html. [9]. Tara Vishwanath and Xiaoping Yu, 2008, “Providing Social Protection and Livelihood Support,” World Bank, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/CHINAEXTN/Resources/318949-1217387111415/Social_Protection_en.pdf. Grosh, M., Del Ninno C., Tesliuc, E., Ouerghi. A. 2008. For Protection and Promotion: The Design and Implementation of Effective Safety Nets. World Bank. [10]. Tripartite Core Group (Government of the Union of Myanmar, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, United Nations), 2008, “Post-Nargis Social Impacts Monitoring,” http://www.aseansec.org/CN-SocialImpactMonitoring-November08.pdf. [11]. Ruchira Bhattamishra and Christopher C. Barrett, 2008, “Community-Based Risk Management Arrangements: An Overview and Implications for Social Fund Program,” World Bank, SP Discussion Paper No. 0830, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOCIALPROTECTION/Resources/SP-Discussion-papers/Social-Funds-DP/0830.pdf. [12]. Renos Vakis, 2006, “Complementing Natural Disasters Management: The Role of Social Protection,” World Bank, SP Discussion Paper No. 0543, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOCIALPROTECTION/Resources/SP-Discussion-papers/Social-Risk-Management-DP/0543.pdf. [13]. Rasmus Heltberg, 2007, “Helping South Asia Cope Better with Natural Disasters: The Role of Social Protection,” Development Policy Review, vol. 25, no. 6, pp. 681–98; and ODI Humanitarian Practice Network: The World Bank’s Experience With Cash Support In Some Recent Natural Disasters, Humanitarian Exchange Magazine, Issue 40, http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?id=2937. [14]. Rasmus Heltberg, 2007, “Helping South Asia Cope Better with Natural Disasters: The Role of Social Protection,” Development Policy Review, vol. 25, no. 6, pp. 681–98; and ODI Humanitarian Practice Network: The World Bank’s Experience With Cash Support In Some Recent Natural Disasters, Humanitarian Exchange Magazine, Issue 40, http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?id=2937. [15]. Carlo Del Ninno, Kalanidhi Subbarao, and Annamaria Milazzo, 2009, “How to Make Public Works Work: A Review of the Experiences,” World Bank, SP Discussion Paper No. 0905, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOCIALPROTECTION/Resources/SP-Discussion-papers/Safety-Nets-DP/0905.pdf. The use of multiple targeting methods makes the identification of the neediest more accurate and comprehensive. The pure self-selection might be insufficient in reaching vulnerable groups in poor areas or when the demand for participation is very large and some form of employment rationing is needed. [16]. Carlo Del Ninno, Kalanidhi Subbarao, and Annamaria Milazzo, 2009, “How to Make Public Works Work: A Review of the Experiences,” World Bank, SP Discussion Paper No. 0905. [17]. Tara Vishwanath and Xiaoping Yu, 2008, “Providing Social Protection and Livelihood Support,” World Bank, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/CHINAEXTN/Resources/318949-1217387111415/Social_Protection_en.pdf. [18]. Tripartite Core Group (Government of the Union of Myanmar, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, United Nations), 2008, “Post-Nargis Social Impacts Monitoring,” http://www.aseansec.org/CN-SocialImpactMonitoring-November08.pdf. [19]. Sultan Barakat,2003, “Housing Reconstruction after Conflict and Disaster,” Humanitarian Practice Network Paper, Overseas Development Institute, http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?id=2577. [20].World Bank, 2003, Social Analysis Sourcebook: Incorporating Social Dimensions into Bank-Supported Projects (Washington, DC: World Bank); John Twigg, 2007, Tools for Mainstreaming Disaster Risk Reduction, Social Impact Assessment, Guidance Note 11 (Geneva: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and the ProVention Consortium), http://www.proventionconsortium.org/themes/default/pdfs/tools_for_mainstreaming_GN11.pdf; and International Association of Impact Assessment, 2003, “Social Impact Assessment. International Principles,” Special Publications Series No. 2, http://www.iaia.org/publicdocuments/special-publications/SP2.pdf. [21]. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), “gender” refers to the socially constructed roles, behaviors, activities, and attributes that a given society considers appropriate for men and women. Gender is an important consideration in SA. [22]. The term “stakeholder” includes the people affected by the project (beneficiaries, affected population) and people able to influence it (organizations, institutions). See also Chapter 12, Community Organizing and Participation, for a discussion of this topic. [23]. “Social risks” include country risks, political economy risks, institutional risks, exogenous risks, and vulnerability risks, among others.
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