This Chapter Is Especially Useful For:
· Policy makers · Lead disaster agency This chapter is intended to provide guidance on the application of World Bank safeguards in post-disaster projects. It contains (1) a review of environmental and social safeguards procedures for normal operations, (2) a review of environmental and social safeguards procedures for post-disaster operations, (3) observations about the implementation of safeguards, and (4) case studies related to specific operations. It also includes links to the formats needed to prepare various documents required in the post-disaster environmental and social review process. The World Bank’s environmental and social safeguard policies are a cornerstone of its support to sustainable poverty reduction. The objective of these policies is to prevent and mitigate undue harm to people and their environment in the development process. These policies provide guidelines for Bank and borrower staffs in the identification, preparation, and implementation of programs and projects. The Bank believes that the effectiveness and development impact of projects and programs it supports has substantially increased as a result of attention to these policies. Safeguard policies also provide a platform for the participation of stakeholders in project design and have been an important instrument for building a sense of ownership among local populations. In essence, the safeguards ensure that environmental and social issues are evaluated in decision making, help reduce and manage the risks associated with a project or program, and provide a mechanism for consultation and disclosure of information. The safeguards are listed below. More detailed summaries of selected safeguard policies are included in the annex, Safeguard Policy Summaries.
*Safeguards most likely to apply in post-disaster situations.
The table below outlines the requirements for each of these elements. Elements of World Bank Environmental Assessment
As described in Chapter 21, World Bank Response to Crises and Emergencies, World Bank response to emergencies (including natural disasters) is guided by OP/BP 8.00, “Rapid Response to Crises and Emergencies”[3] and the “Rapid Response to Crises and Emergencies: Procedural Guidelines.”
Generally speaking, Emergency Recovery Projects are not exempt from the World Bank EA Policy (see OP 4.01, paragraph 13). Under unusual circumstances, a project may be exempted, but this requires a formal process and the justification must be recorded in the loan documents. If any waivers or exemptions from OP/BP 8.00 are required, the Task Team Leader should seek approvals prior to loan negotiations. The EA policy requires that the World Bank operation determine:
Combined Preparation-Appraisal Mission
Prior to the departure of the combined preparation-appraisal mission, the Task Team (ideally the Task Team Safeguards Specialist) should perform the following:
New loan
Prepare a draft ISDS for the project. The ISDS will be revised and updated during project preparation.
Project restructuring
Revise the ISDS from the original project design, as appropriate.
New loan or project restructuring
Determine country-specific policies and regulations for environmental safeguards (primarily EA) in emergency/disaster situations. If such information is not available, LEGEN should provide the Task Team with the primary government contacts who have this information. During the combined preparation-appraisal mission, the Task Team Safeguards Specialist will take the following steps.
Upon mission completion, the Task Team Safeguards Specialist will take the following steps.
Legal agreements must include obligations of the borrower to implement the requirements specified in the EA documents. EA Documentation Requirements
Normally, an emergency operation will require two procedural approaches: one for known subprojects to be implemented immediately, and another for projects that would be identified in the future in different time horizons (immediate, transitional, and long term).
For subprojects not known at the time of loan approval. An ESSAF is required for these loans. The environmental portion of the ESSAF describes EA safeguard review procedures to be followed as subprojects are identified and considered for financing. This framework should have the following characteristics.
The following observations are based on discussions with Task Managers of post-disaster operations.
ESSAF preparation. The ESSAF document is a unique World Bank safeguard requirement.[4] Unless the host country already has had a World Bank disaster operation, host country institutions involved with disaster operations (Ministry of Housing, Ministry of Finance, etc.) are normally not familiar with World Bank safeguard requirements and would likely take a very long time to produce the ESSAF document by themselves, likely involving several iterations. Furthermore, host countries do not usually place a high priority on environmental and social safeguard issues during disaster situations, and the ESSAF document is often viewed as an obstacle to receiving the immediate assistance they need. Forcing attention on these concerns may be extremely frustrating to all parties concerned and could affect the relationship between the host government and the World Bank. Therefore, the Bank team should either prepare the draft ESSAF for the host country review and approval or work closely with the host country in preparing the ESSAF document. At least one public consultation with affected groups should be conducted as part of ESSAF preparation to ascertain priority issues. This will help identify the need for safeguard policies other than EA and resettlement being triggered (e.g., natural habitats, cultural properties). ESSAF capacity assessment. As part of the ESSAF preparation, the World Bank team should conduct a capacity assessment of the institutions that will be responsible for ESSAF implementation to determine if there is sufficient staff/expertise/authority to implement ESSAF requirements. It is strongly recommended that such an assessment be done ex-ante in countries prone to natural disasters (in this way valuable time in a disaster operation will not be spent on preparing a capacity assessment evaluation). ESSAF implementation. The ESSAF requirement is relatively new, and implementation experience in practice has so far not been exemplary. It is a critical aspect of World Bank safeguards to ensure proper supervision and follow-up of ESSAF implementation. In disaster situations, host governments will generally agree initially to the Bank’s environmental requirements in the interest of getting access to the resources that are needed to address the disaster. Without guidance on ESSAF implementation and attention from the World Bank, ESSAF requirements may be forgotten during project implementation. If there is a Project Implementation Unit (PIU), the project team should require an environmental and/or a social safeguards specialist be included on the PIU staff, either a staff person or an experienced consultant. The PIU should issue regular, frequent reports to affected groups and implementing institutions on any environmental or social issues that arise, measures taken to address these issues, parties responsible for addressing the issues, and a schedule for their resolution. The PIU should also issue regular and frequent information to affected groups regarding vital services, such as safety of water supply, and interim arrangements for wastewater management and solid waste disposal. 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, Emergency Recovery Program, Sri Lanka
The government of Sri Lanka asked, inter alia, the World Bank for assistance in conducting a damage assessment and, simultaneously, worked with the World Bank to prepare a restructuring operation: “Tsunami Emergency Recovery Program – Phase I.” Design and preparation. Safeguard policies as required by the World Bank were adequately designed into the project framework. An Environmental and Social Screening and Assessment framework (ESSAF) was prepared. The framework was designed to help government properly address and mitigate safeguard issues. For environmental risks, this included an assessment of governments’ review and approval process for EIAs and of its capacity to monitor implementation of environmental mitigating measures. Implementation. The period after the tsunami saw a boom in reconstruction activities across the country. Government adopted a policy of “build back better.” As a consequence, the opportunity to integrate cross-cutting ecological and environmental concerns was lost. After the disaster, government announced the use of a buffer zone as a disaster prevention mechanism. This was most likely done as an immediate response and was not based on sound technical judgment or on public consultation. The resulting effects on the environment were profound. With physical reconstruction prohibited in the “no build zone,” vast extents of new hinterland (including some natural areas) were cleared for proposed housing schemes. No system of EA was involved with the site selection and construction process; environmental planning took a low priority. The policy was later withdrawn and the Coast Conservation Department developed a more reasonable Coastal Zone Management Plan. Key environmental issues included those associated with extraction of natural resources as construction materials. Reconstruction created a building boom of unprecedented scale and a high demand for sand, timber, rubble, and clay, among other resources. There was no system in place to verify the origin of these materials, even though sources were identified in the EIAs. As a consequence, much of this material was extracted illegally. Although the EIAs discussed removal of debris, by the time the EIAs were mobilized, debris had already been removed and used for roads and landfill. This gave rise to adverse drainage issues in some locations. In summary, the project did include environmental safeguards as required. However, post-clearance monitoring and secondary impacts were not properly anticipated or addressed. 1999 Marmara Earthquake Emergency Reconstruction Project, Turkey Context. On August 17, 1999, an earthquake measuring 7.4 on the Richter scale devastated the Marmara region of Turkey. More than 15,000 lives were lost and about 200,000 people were left homeless. The World Bank undertook an assessment to outline the likely impact of the earthquake on the economy and estimated the fiscal burden for reconstruction and recovery in the range of US$1.8–US$2.2 billion. The largest direct cost (US$0.7–US$1.2 billion) was for reconstruction and repair of the region’s housing stock. Design and preparation. The main objectives of the program were to restore living conditions in the affected region of Marmara, support economic recovery and growth, and develop an institutional framework for disaster risk management and mitigation. Investments included housing replacement or reconstruction and restoration of sports fields, playgrounds, and other common spaces. Feedback from housing reconstruction beneficiaries received during public consultations soon after the disaster led to design changes in the housing units. Monitoring and evaluation activities of the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) and consultant reports resulted in additional public outreach efforts to the beneficiaries of the rural housing reconstruction component. A monthly newsletter was published and distributed by the PIU at the earthquake reconstruction project sites. This allowed for further adjustments and reallocations during project implementation. Implementation. The project was developed with full compliance with the World Bank safeguard policies in effect at the time of preparation (EA and involuntary resettlement). During preparation, sites proposed by government for urban housing were planned on public land, but early in the implementation process it was clear that some expropriation would be needed. The Task Team did due diligence and proceeded in compliance with the requirements of OP 4.12, including adherence to the Resettlement Plan and close supervision of compensation. Regular site visits were made by the PIU’s social scientist. Environmental safeguards were also monitored closely by the PIU, its local branches, and the World Bank Task Team with respect to compliance with the Environmental Management Plan. The PIU had well-qualified engineers, provided environmental training to the contractors, and had a constant presence at the construction sites. Monthly environmental reports were prepared and submitted to the World Bank for review. Both the PIU and the World Bank were actively involved in ensuring high environmental standards for the reconstruction, exemplified by careful attention to the construction of a sewage treatment plant to ensure adequate treatment before municipal sewage from the housing complex near Golcuk was discharged into the Bay of Izmit. Also, as a result of careful site monitoring, additional measures for erosion control were introduced. 1999 Armenia Earthquake Recovery Project, Colombia
Design and Preparation. Within a week of the disaster, international donors and nongovernmental organizations assisted with immediate needs (clearing debris and temporary shelter). The World Bank was involved in the medium- and longer-term reconstruction program. Four existing World Bank loans (Municipal Health Services, Secondary Education, Agricultural Technology Development and Urban Environmental Management) were restructured for this project (totaling US$93 million). The government of Colombia established a Reconstruction Fund for the Coffee Region (FOREC) reporting to the country’s president. FOREC was to finance, execute, and coordinate the economic, social, and environmental reconstruction of the affected region. FOREC’s functions were to design operational guidelines for implementation of reconstruction activities, work with local mayors to provide a framework for reconstruction activities, and oversee the reconstruction effort. The World Bank prepared the Earthquake Recovery Loan with an additional US$225 million to continue the reconstruction effort for repair of 509 schools, rebuilding of 142 schools, and repair of 74 hospitals and health centers. Implementation. Government recognized immediately that the earthquake had caused a number of environmental problems, and the reconstruction process offered a number of opportunities to strengthen local environmental institutions and improve environmental management. A Regional Environmental Management Plan was ordered by presidential decree (1999) that was intended to ensure the reconstruction process (including debris removal) followed environmental safeguards and ensured environmental sustainability of natural resources. Environmental standards for reconstruction work were established, land use plans were prepared which, inter alia, identified high-risk areas that were not to be developed. The process included public participation. As a result of this effort, approximately 13,000 families had to be relocated from high-risk areas. This approach enhanced local government capacity for environmental management (e.g., debris handling, soil stabilization, drainage management). As a result of these efforts, municipal administrations had a greater role in land use for public and social infrastructure works, and new housing was not placed in high-risk areas.
[1]. World Bank, 1999, OP 4.01 “Environmental Assessment,” http://go.worldbank.org/9MIMAQUHN0 and BP 4.01 “Environmental Assessment,” http://go.worldbank.org/9MIMAQUHN0; and “Environmental Assessment Sourcebook and Updates,” http://go.worldbank.org/LLF3CMS1I0. [2]. World Bank, 1999, OP 4.01 “Environmental Assessment, Annex C, Environmental Management Plan” http://go.worldbank.org/B06520UI80. [3]. World Bank, “OP 8.00, Rapid Response to Crises and Emergencies,” http://go.worldbank.org/IKGMVADFB0 and “BP 8.00, Rapid Response to Crises and Emergencies,” http://go.worldbank.org/IE6E6NYJG1. [4]. For samples of project ISDS documents, search in World Bank, “Documents and Reports,” under “Project Documents,” http://go.worldbank.org/XFNFIE0SO0. [5]. See World Bank, “Rapid Response to Crises and Emergencies: Procedural Guidelines.”
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