Chapter 2 Assessing Damage and Setting Reconstruction Policy

Assessment and Classification of Emergencies. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) established the Assessment and Classification of Emergencies (ACE) project in 2008 in an attempt to map the various humanitarian assessment initiatives currently under way and to facilitate the development of an overarching approach to assessment. In February 2009, UN OCHA issued its “Mapping of Key Emergency Needs Assessment and Analysis Initiatives: Final Report,” which analyzes the main assessment and analysis framework initiatives under way at the global level.^[5] However, a wide variety of multi-sectoral and/or sector-specific tools used by particular organizations in the field were not analyzed, including those of donors.

The report organizes the various assessment initiatives in three categories:

1. standards-related initiatives, which serve as a foundation for assessment tools and data collection (for example, the Sphere Project^[6]);
2. primary data collection, distinguishing between rapid and in-depth assessments (for example, the Local Estimate of Needs for Shelter and Settlement [LENSS], described below, being developed by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee [IASC] Emergency Shelter Cluster); and
3. analysis frameworks, where information and data generated by the two previous categories are integrated into a framework for analysis and/or planning (for example, the Post-Disaster Needs Assessment [PDNA] project, described below, being carried out by the UN, the World Bank, and the European Commission [EC]).
   

As part of this effort, the ACE working group prepared a sequencing framework, which is useful for understanding when the various needs assessment initiatives (not all of which are yet in use) are being or would be applied within the emergency timeline. The timeline includes 24 separate assessments instruments or initiatives.

Needs Assessment Task Force. Since the issuance of the ACE report, a Needs Assessment Task Force (NATF) has been appointed, co-chaired by UN OCHA and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC).^[7] NATF was created to strengthen decision making and to improve response by harmonizing and promoting cross-sector needs assessment initiatives that produce consistent, reliable, and timely data on humanitarian needs. Initially focusing its work on preparedness, Phase I (first 72 hours), and Phase II (first 2 weeks) in sudden onset emergencies, NATF will later work on Phase III (second 2 weeks) onward, including early recovery, and will address slow onset emergencies, as progress is made on the first phases.

If the effort to harmonize assessment methodologies is successful, future results will include (1) development of a consolidated needs assessment “tool box,” including standardized tools, such as forms and questionnaires that can be adapted for specific contexts; (2) better data management and reduction in the unnecessary collection of similar information; (3) the development of a core set of indicators per sector, which would be consistently collected, thereby improving data aggregation, prioritization of needs across sectors, and equitable response; and (4) multi-sectoral needs assessment tools to collect core common data for decision making and immediate life-saving interventions. In the meantime, governments and agencies working in reconstruction will encounter a variety of assessment methods and tools, and should carefully evaluate the quality of the outputs from these methodologies before acting on them.

Post-Disaster Needs Assessment project. The PDNA project is a cooperative effort between United Nations agencies (led by the United Nations Development Programme as the Chair of the Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery^[8] [CWGER]), the World Bank, and the EC to develop a practical guide to a multi-stakeholder PDNA and a recovery framework (RF).

The objective of this project is to develop a shared understanding of the impact of a natural disaster by integrating assessment methods used by international financial institutions (IFIs) (primarily the DaLA methodology developed by UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean [ECLAC], which was published in 1991 and reissued in an updated format in 2003), which focus on macro-economic issues, and those used by the IASC humanitarian clusters, UN agencies, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), which tend to be sectoral and to have a humanitarian focus. It ultimately aims to improve coordination and capacity at national and international levels to conduct recovery-oriented needs assessments and to carry out recovery planning, in order to connect national plans with the delivery of recovery programs at the local level.

Expected outputs from the PDNA project include (1) protocols of cooperation between the United Nations, the World Bank, and the EC covering joint missions and capacity building; (2) a practical guide to multi-stakeholder PDNA and the RF; and (3) field-testing and training on the framework in high-risk countries with national and international recovery partners. In addition, sectoral assessment methods that are relevant to PDNA will be adapted to enable them to better determine early recovery needs in each sector.

Sharing disaster assessment data reduces duplication of effort and cost. UN OCHA is promoting the use of Humanitarian Information Centers (HICs), geographic information systems (GIS), data standardization, and other tools to make post-disaster data collection more efficient.^[15] See Chapter 17, Information and Communications Technology in Reconstruction, for a discussion of HICs and other information and technology-related strategies relevant to reconstruction.

Managing assessment data is not without its risks. Some consider that assessment data should be treated effectively as a “public good,” and the merits of this point of view are easily understood with respect to avoiding the duplication of data collection efforts. “Assessment fatigue” on the part of affected communities is frequently mentioned, and sharing data can help reduce this problem as well. However, data collected in assessments need to be handled and presented with care, since they represent personal information and in some cases may be of a nature that they are protected by confidentiality laws. The fact of the emergency should not override these rights. Information collected in assessments will also reflect the biases of both the informants and the assessors, and biases may affect the interpretation of data collected as well. If the assessors are not experienced, training will be needed before they conduct the assessment. Lastly, assessment data should be compared to baseline information, which may reside in government, but may not be readily available.

Good assessment design, data collection protocols, and data management procedures can help control the risks mentioned above. Assessment design and data collection should anticipate how the information will be used. Rules for data confidentiality and disclosure should also be established. If a HIC or other common data management system is established, its functions can include review of assessment instruments, tabulation and interpretation of data, securing and management of baseline data, and definition of rules for data management and disclosure.

Ensuring data quality. For primary data, it may be advisable that data collection be organized at an interagency level and led by government, with one government department taking the lead in coordinating and managing data collection across departments and with agencies to ensure that:

• data are collected on the basis of an agreed-to and mutually consistent analysis plan;
• damage classification criteria and categories are consistent across sectors;
• damage classification criteria are consistent within a sector, and across various administrative/geographical divisions;
• data are validated using empirical tools and plausibility checks; and
• baseline asset classification, such as definitions of various types of houses and categories of infrastructure, such as primary, secondary, and tertiary infrastructure, is consistent among assessments and with public accounts.
  

If independent assessment teams are concurrently determining damage levels or reconstruction needs, then guidelines and tools should be made available to ensure the consistency of the estimates of need, such as use of common rates and uniform reconstruction benchmarks for housing and infrastructure. Templates can be developed to ensure that damage data are being collected in a structured and uniform manner. Orientation sessions for assessors are essential to train them on the meaning of terms used in the templates, as well as on collection methods. Assessment teams should practice on damaged houses until their results are consistent. See Chapter 16, Training Requirements in Reconstruction, for more advice on training assessors.

• involving vulnerable group members in assessment and in all stages of decision making;
• obtaining information about the needs of the affected group from both men and women;
• collecting data disaggregated by sex, age, health status, economic class, etc., and then using the disaggregated data in both program planning and monitoring;
• paying special attention in assessments to groups that experience social exclusion (such as the handicapped, widows, and female heads of household); and
• assessing disaster impact on the informal social protection systems that vulnerable groups depend on, not just the “bricks and mortar” impacts.

The Process of Response and Reconstruction Flowchart included after the handbook’s table of contents provides an overview of the types and sequence of decisions policy makers will be required to make in reconstruction. Individual chapters of this handbook discuss sector-specific policy options that should be considered, such as policies for environmental management, land use planning, and disaster risk management, to name a few. However, this section stresses the importance of elaborating an integrated reconstruction policy and strategy to guide the reconstruction program and communicating it broadly. While this is needed for all sectors, this section focuses specifically on the policy for housing and community reconstruction.

The political economy of reconstruction. In recent analytical work conducted on improving the results of policy reform related to poverty reduction, the World Bank has defined “political economy” as the study of the interactions between political processes and economic variables.  A political economy perspective provides insight into the dynamics of reform processes within a country or locality. Stakeholders’ interests, and the power relations between social actors, influence their support or opposition to reforms. According to the Bank, the sequencing and timing of

actions associated with policy reforms can also determine the level of tension and conflict, the duration, and ultimately the success or failure of reforms.

Reconstruction may not be viewed as policy reform per se, especially due to the accelerated nature of the reconstruction process. However, to the extent that the way in which reconstruction is carried out changes the power relationships or allocation of resources within society, it has many of the same effects as traditional policy reform. For instance, if tenure security is provided to affected communities in reconstruction (as this handbook recommends), there is an economic transfer to those communities, which, as a result, gain social standing and potential future influence.

Political economy factors will be brought to bear on the reconstruction process as economic and social interests vie for influence in many areas, including (1) setting the reconstruction agenda, (2) managing the message through communications with the public, (3) allocating the resources among social groups, and (4) gaining access to the resources being spent. Governments should analyze how political economy factors constitute risks or opportunities for the reconstruction program—including looking at how stakeholders are using their position to protect or strengthen their political or economic interests by building coalitions, negotiating, building consensus, and bargaining to generate outcomes that are favorable to them—and be prepared to manage this aspect of reconstruction. This may require the assistance of political scientists or political economy experts.

Because, inevitably, reconstruction benefits some more than others, and because government itself is part of a country’s political economy, it is impossible to inoculate the reconstruction process from political economy influences. Good governance of the reconstruction process is the best antidote. Therefore, the goal in reconstruction should be to establish and orchestrate a reconstruction process whose outcomes promote social equity and reflect good governance practices. The dimensions of governance used in the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project,  shown in the text box, have become widely accepted. Good governance practice material is cited throughout  Chapter 19, Mitigating the Risk of Corruption, and its annexes.

Challenges in defining reconstruction policy. Data collected during assessments are critical evidence for establishing the reconstruction policy. However, it is highly likely that not all the necessary information will be available when the policy is first outlined and even announced publicly. For instance, a rapid assessment of housing damage may give government a estimate of the number of affected households, and perhaps of the extent of housing damage, but is unlikely to provide reliable estimates of the cost of repairing or the number of houses that will need to be demolished. That requires a housing damage assessment. This “information lag” creates a number of challenges that policy makers are forced to confront in defining and announcing reconstruction policy.

The parameters of the reconstruction policy. Two case studies of successful reconstruction policies are included below. While there is no template for a reconstruction policy, the chapters of this handbook represent the critical areas that need to be covered in such a policy, and each provides relevant advice for policy makers. Particularly important are the chapters in Section 1, Assessing Impact and Defining Reconstruction Policy, and Section 2, Planning Reconstruction. The scope of the policy, and the corresponding chapters, include the following.

• No single competent government agency designated to manage assessments after the disaster; leaving it instead to individual agencies.
• Government overpromising in the early days after the disaster before sufficient information is available.
• Inaccuracies in the damage assessment caused by the lack of baseline data (original condition of infrastructure and housing) or inconsistencies of data from various sources.
• Proliferation of assessments and the resulting assessment fatigue among the affected population. False expectations being created in the assessed population.
• Failure of agencies to share assessment data.
• Inadequate assessment quality because assessors are not sufficiently trained.
• Local requirements not reflected because community or other local data are not incorporated in national assessments. Needs of vulnerable populations not highlighted in assessments.
• Owners who damage their own housing in order to qualify for compensation because the assessment of housing damages takes place after the assistance scheme is announced.
• Assessment data not objectively analyzed. Assessments carried out simply to justify agency decisions, not to inform them.
• Reconstruction policy that does not take sector investment plans and long-standing needs into account.
• Lack of stakeholder consultation in the process for establishing the reconstruction policy.

1. Conduct multi-donor assessments whenever possible, using standardized assessment methodologies.
2. In designing the assessment and data collection, take into consideration how the information will be used and shared, the biases of the assessors, and the need for training.
3. Treat national and sector-specific data collected during assessments as public information, while respecting principles of confidentiality, to reduce duplication of data collection efforts.
4. Evaluate the needs of different groups and individuals (such as men, women, the elderly, and children) during assessments. Seek out marginalized groups and evaluate their needs and interests as well.
5. Advocate for a Communication-Based Assessment at the beginning of the project cycle to ensure that the reconstruction program is designed based on its results.
6. Consult with the community regarding the need for information and consider using community-led assessments to complement the information gathered from traditional assessment methodologies.
7. Establish a clear system of damage categories for housing, and try to carry out housing damage assessments before announcing the housing assistance scheme.
8. Observe the warnings regarding the announcement of reconstruction policy, such as the need to consider the impact of short-term shelter decisions on longer-term reconstruction.
9. Understand that the reconstruction policy should be one of the primary messages to be passed along to the public through the communication plan. Remember that what’s important is what people hear, not what is said to them.
10. If reconstruction is not going well, or there are concerns about institutional capacity for reconstruction, conduct a housing sector assessment to identify whether assistance may be needed.

When an earthquake measuring 6.9 on the Richter Scale struck Gujarat, India, on January 26, 2001, and was followed by more than 500 aftershocks, the effect was devastating and somewhat unexpected, given the geological characteristics of the location where it struck. Approximately 13,800 people died and approximately 167,000 were injured. More than 1.2 million houses were damaged or destroyed and nearly all the civic facilities—schools, hospitals, health centers, and public buildings—were damaged, some extensively. The utility infrastructure, including water supply, electricity, and telecommunications, was completely disrupted.

The government of the state of Gujarat announced the Gujarat Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Policy^[17] four months after the earthquake. The policy document, only 30 pages long, included the creation of the Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority. (It had actually been created in the month following the earthquake; the policy document formalized the entity). It proposed different reconstruction approach for urban and rural reconstruction and in different regions of the state, depending on their seismic zone. The cost of rebuilding was estimated at US$1.77 billion, of which more than half was to be borrowed from IFIs.

Policy objectives. The stated objectives of the policy included building, retrofitting, repairing, and strengthening houses and public buildings, and improving the earthquake resistance of what was rebuilt. Other objectives related to revival of the local economy, reconstruction of community and social infrastructure, health support to those affected by the earthquake, restoration of lifeline and major infrastructure, gender empowerment, social attention to the poor, implementation of a comprehensive disaster preparedness and management program, and the need for long-term mitigation of a variety of risks to which the population was exposed.

Guiding principles. Among the guiding principles of the policy were the need to involve people and representative institutions in decision making; the strengthening of civil society institutions; the importance of ensuring that the needs of the vulnerable were addressed; the necessity to give people information to make informed choices in rebuilding, including about disaster risk reduction; and the importance of involving the private sector, NGOs, and expert institutions in the reconstruction program. Lastly, it called for the highest levels of transparency and accountability in the reconstruction program through the use of appropriate institutional mechanisms and practices.

Housing sector policy. The housing sector was defined as encompassing debris removal, salvage, and recycling; construction of temporary shelters; reconstruction of more than 230,000 houses; repairs and strengthening of more than 1 million houses; and reconstruction and repairs of government staff quarters. The policy established that there would be a community-driven housing recovery process, under which earthquake-affected communities would be given a range of choices from complete or partial relocation to in-situ reconstruction. While acknowledging that there existed a predominant sentiment for minimal relocation, this policy gave communities the responsibility for deciding on their preferred option, using a participatory process. Selection of new sites would be undertaken with the support of village officials and the NGO or other agency assisting the village. Other aspects of the policy included:

• delegation of technical and financial powers for the housing reconstruction process to the district administration or Area Development Authorities;
• use of a community-based, owner-driven approach, with technical assistance from engineers provided by government, building centers, NGOs, etc.; and
• basing reconstruction on a tripartite partnership, including the government of Gujarat, the private sector (including NGOs), and the beneficiaries.
  

Assistance packages. The government of Gujarat announced five packages of assistance for reconstruction, retrofitting, and repairs of approximately a million houses destroyed or damaged in the earthquake. The amounts varied depending on the type of house, the extent of damages, and the location.

• Package 1: For villages in seismic Zones IV and V, where more than 50 percent of the houses collapsed
• Package 2: For villages in Zones IV and V, which opted for in-situ reconstruction
• Package 3: Villages situated in areas other than Zones IV and V, where individual houses were destroyed or damaged
• Package 4-A: Reinforced cement concrete frame structures (low- and high-rise) in urban areas, which include municipal corporations, urban development authority areas, and other municipalities (excluding Bhuj, Bhachau, Rapar, and Anjar in the Kutch District)
• Package 4-B: Load-bearing structures in corporation areas, urban development authority areas, and municipalities (except Bhuj, Bhachau, Rapar, and Anjar in the Kutch District)
• Package 5: Rehabilitation in the four worst affected municipal towns of Bhuj, Anjar, Bhachau, and Rapar in the district of Kutch, with a stress on urban town planning

Urban rehabilitation. In Kutch, four towns­—Bhuj, Bhachau, Anjar, and Rapar—suffered large-scale devastation. The collapse of a large number of multistory buildings and the limited availability of land in these towns called for a different strategy for rehabilitation. Congested inner towns were redeveloped, and the residents were given the option of relocation. A number of residents living in multistory buildings were asked to construct houses on new plots, in view of new town planning rules, development regulations, and a reduced floor space index.

The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami had a widespread impact on the fishing villages and towns along the coastline of Tamil Nadu, India. The state had never seen a calamity of this nature. More than 8,000 lives were lost and 1 million people were affected. Most of the 54,000 housing units affected were destroyed. More than 400 schools, health clinics, and other public buildings were destroyed and many more were damaged, as were roads and other infrastructure. The impact was spread over 13 districts and 350 towns or villages. The entire coastal economy of Tamil Nadu was affected.

The Tamil Nadu State Tsunami Reconstruction Policy^[18] addressed a wide range of issues, focusing on the environment, livelihoods, and shelter, and included all the measures the government of Tamil Nadu was taking to bring the lives of the affected people back to normal. The responsibility for managing reconstruction was assigned to a Project Implementation Unit within the Revenue Administration, Disaster Management, and Mitigation Department of the state government. Numerous state agencies and the federal government collaborated in the effort. The cost of rebuilding in Tamil Nadu was estimated at US$880 million. Of this, US$566 million was borrowed from IFIs.

Assessment. A questionnaire was developed by the state and administered by district officials to ascertain the number of affected families in each zone, the type of construction, the ownership of the structures, the number of family members, etc. The survey covered 278,000 families who lived within 1,000 meters of the coast. The survey included families whose houses were not damaged, but whose livelihoods had been affected by the tsunami. The survey results formed the basis of the choices before government in terms of the area, the average size of houses to be built, the general nature of construction, and the approximate cost. The survey showed that tenancy was an issue mainly in the urban areas, so a policy decision on this aspect of reconstruction was postponed until further input could be gathered.

Housing sector policy. Within two weeks of the tsunami, the Revenue Administration, Disaster Management, and Mitigation Department had issued a government order^[19] that announced a comprehensive village development model. The order promoted private participation in reconstruction, limiting the role of government to providing land, specifications for housing, and common amenities. The order included the parameters for the projects and solicited NGO proposals. Media advertisements were issued calling for support.

The specific policies established to guide reconstruction included extensive consultation with stakeholders, community choice on relocation decision, agency-driven reconstruction with NGOs providing resources and assisting communities, a strong role for district governments with support from the state, adherence to coastal zone regulations, safe rebuilding according to building codes and guidelines, and financial assistance for a core house with a choice of models.

Disaster risk reduction. Government acknowledged that most of the buildings damaged by the tsunami were built with construction practices that were not appropriate for the area, given the hazards it was exposed to. To mitigate future risks, the reconstruction policy for housing and infrastructure would strongly promote use of disaster-resistant technologies. The decision about whether the community would relocate was left to the community itself. Relocated communities were given free parcels of land in urban and rural areas.

Assistance packages. Assistance was provided by NGOs and was the same for all. The amount was sufficient to provide a core house and basic infrastructure. This approach was used both for equity purposes and because the property records would not have permitted a fair valuation of the property that was lost.

The state decided to adhere to the Coastal Regulatory Zone regulations under the Environment Protection Act, which regulate building activity up to 500 meters from the high tide line. The only exceptions were for fishers, who were allowed to stay if not willing to relocate beyond 200 meters, but who were not allowed to rebuild, only repair, their houses, and were not given housing assistance.

Building codes. The state relief commissioner’s office set up a committee of experts to study the National Building Code and the guidelines developed in Gujarat after the earthquake. They suggested modifications based on the windy conditions prevailing along the Tamil Nadu coast. These were used to develop the core house designs.

Institutional arrangements. While owner-driven construction was permitted, in the end, NGOs, donors, and government built most of the housing with a high level of community involvement. District governments were given responsibility for coordination of the reconstruction, with significant financial and technical support from the state. NGOs of various kinds were invited to provide reconstruction resources and to assist communities. In those cases where NGOs or corporations did not come forward, reconstruction was coordinated by district collectors and financed by government after organizing the families into self-help groups.

Insurance and title. The housing assistance included payment for 10 years of property insurance on the new houses. The ownership of the houses passed to both the husband and wife after construction was completed.

Communications with stakeholders. Several rounds of consultations were held by the districts with the community regarding the housing aspirations of the affected families, especially women. Five housing models were developed. When the original designs did not have a staircase, this was subsequently changed based on consultations.

ECLAC. Handbook for Estimating the Socio-economic and Environmental Effects of Disasters. Mexico: ECLAC. http://www.eclac.cl/cgi-bin/getProd.asp?xml=/publicaciones/xml/4/12774/P12774.xml&xsl=/mexico/tpl-i/p9f.xsl&base=/mexico/tpl/top-bottom.xsl.

Global Risk Identification Program. http://www.gripweb.org/grip.php?ido=1000&lang=eng.

IASC Emergency Shelter Cluster. 2009. LENSS Tool Kit, Field Version. Nairobi: UN-HABITAT. http://www.unhabitat.org/pmss/listItemDetails.aspx?publicationID=2738.

IFRC. 2005. Guidelines for Emergency Assessment. Geneva: IFRC. http://www.proventionconsortium.org/themes/default/pdfs/71600-Guidelines-for-emergency-en.pdf.

IFRC, Sichuan Earthquake Support Operations. 2008. Shelter Assessment Report Sichuan Province, China. http://www.scribd.com/doc/9666212/sichuan-shelter-assessment-report-final-report?autodown=pdf.

International Recovery Program Initiative on Early Recovery. “OCHA Disaster Response Preparedness Toolkit.” http://ocha.unog.ch/drptoolkit/PPreparednessEarlyRecovery.html.

International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR). 2006. “Words Into Action: Implementing the Hyogo Framework for Action Document for Consultation.” http://www.preventionweb.net/english/professional/publications/v.php?id=594.

Kelly, Charles. 2008. Damage, Needs or Rights? Defining What Is Required After Disaster. Benfield UCL Hazard Research Centre Disaster Studies and Management Working Paper No. 17. London: Benfield UCL Hazard Research Centre. http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900sid/FBUO-7HWHG9/$file/Benfield-Jul2008.pdf?openelement; United Nations Development Programme, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery.

Tsunami Evaluation Committee. 2006. Joint Evaluation of the International Response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami: Synthesis Report. London: The Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action. http://www.tsunami-evaluation.org/.

UN OCHA. “Information Management.” http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/IMToolBox/index.html. A variety of assessment tools are available here.

United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT). “Disaster Assessment Portal: Assessments for Disaster Response and Early Recovery.” http://www.disasterassessment.org/resources.asp?id=6&cid=1.This site includes a variety of assessment methodologies and other tools.

World Bank. n.d. “Guidelines and Sample Damage and Needs Assessments.” 

World Bank. 2008. The Political Economy of Policy Reform: Issues and Implications for Policy Dialogue and Development Operations. Washington, DC: World Bank.  http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEV/Resources/Political_Economy_of_Policy_Reform.pdf.
 

 How to Do It

The specific objectives of the assessment include the following.

A. Provide a comprehensive analysis of the country’s policy and institutional frameworks for the housing sector and the land administration system, with particular emphasis on:

• the adequacy of these frameworks under normal conditions and their ability to be adapted to the demands of the post-disaster housing reconstruction process;
• the implications of any relevant policies announced since the disaster;
• the capacity of the organizations involved in the housing reconstruction; and
• the specific challenges that have already arisen, or may be expected to emerge, as the post-disaster housing reconstruction program is planned and executed.

B. Provide concrete and specific recommendations on how to improve the response to the disaster in such areas as: policy modifications, institutional roles and responsibilities, coordination mechanisms, and needs for institutional strengthening, including capacity-building activities, financial strategies, or other areas.

Housing reconstruction takes place on a very local and even personal basis. The concerns and perspectives of local actors should have a strong influence on the reconstruction approach. The consultants should use a variety of data collection methods to capture different types of information and social perspectives, and it should have a bias toward capturing the perspective of households, local government officials, and other local actors. A reconstruction approach not based on local reality, and not seen as workable at the local level, is unlikely to succeed. For that reason, it is suggested that the consultants reside in the disaster area while conducting the assessment.

A counterpart in government who understands the policy issues related to the work and who can facilitate contacts and access to information must be appointed. Ideally, this person is supported by a technical committee that includes representation from the affected population.

1. Documentation. Previous studies of the housing sector should be reviewed and may serve as the starting point for this assessment. Key documentation includes, among others things, at the national level, disaster damage, loss, and needs assessments; pronouncements and policies related to the disaster; laws and other material related to the legal framework for housing and land; and national policy documents; and, at the local level, local damage, loss, and needs assessments; registers of affected persons; policy documents; land use plans and policies and related ordinances; capital investment plans; and procedures related to building permitting and inspection.
2. Interviews. National and regional government officials (including representatives from appropriate ministries); municipal authorities (mayor, technical experts, public service organizations, counsel members); social leaders and social movement representatives; the affected population and their representatives; locally active international organizations; civil society organizations and NGOs; academic institutions; and representatives of the private sector.
3. Observations. Time should be dedicated to observations in the field and to taking testimony from unofficial actors, both of which can reveal needs and problems that might otherwise be overlooked.
4. Other. Collect and provide photographs and other documentation that contribute to illustrating the principal findings and/or supporting the conclusions of the assessment.

The work plan and budget form the basis of an ongoing dialogue between government and the organizations that are providing financial support to the reconstruction program.

Time will be of the essence in carrying out this assessment. The following schedule allows the consultancy to be completed in approximately two months. The following time intervals are ambitious, but can be adjusted, depending on the particular situation. Outputs will include:

• an initial report, within 7 days of the contract, in which the consultants present any recommendations for modification of the scope of work as well as a work plan and schedule for the presentation of outputs;
• a draft report, presented within approximately 21 days of the acceptance of the initial report; and
• a final report, presented within the earlier of 21 days of the receipt of comments on the draft report from the party or parties responsible for overseeing the assessment or 30 days of the presentation of the draft report.

The draft and final reports should be presented along with an executive summary or abbreviated version that can be widely circulated, in a language and format easily understandable by stakeholders.

An effective review process will help guarantee the success of the consultancy, and the consultants should take an active role in carrying it out, with assistance from government and the sponsor of the consultancy. This may entail various meetings with government, community, and other stakeholders; use of information technology; or other means to ensure wide distribution of the draft report and collection of feedback. Meetings may also be required once the report is finalized to more widely disseminate the findings and recommendations.

Beside demonstrating to citizens that the recovery period is beginning, housing inspections serve other purposes, including (1) public safety: identify whether houses can be fully or partially occupied, or must be vacated until reconstruction takes place (generally the result of a separate housing safety inspection; see box, below); (2) planning: use the results to quantify the funds, time, and other resources required for recovery, particularly when damage to housing makes up a large component of reconstruction; (3) technical: provide information about the specific types of damage that have been sustained and therefore the types of technical interventions, technical expertise, and training that will be required in reconstruction; and (4) economic and social: provide data on the impacts of the disaster at the household level.

Developing an appropriate methodology for housing damage assessment is one of the most critical aspects of the post-disaster response.^[22] The process must be made transparent and participatory to establish trust with the affected community and to ensure that local knowledge is fully incorporated. It should contribute to disaster risk reduction (DRR), social inclusion, and gender neutrality. The tools should be tailored to local conditions and be designed to ensure reliability and accessibility by the affected population for both collection and review of data. The approach described here also has the benefit of providing a view of the situation from various perspectives. While the content and sophistication of the assessment tools will vary from one disaster to another, it is recommended that all of the following tools be employed in most cases.

Depending on the construction technology in the area, engineering and architectural expertise will likely be needed to translate the assessment data into estimates of time and materials required to carry out at least minimum safety repairs. In addition to repairs, the program may cover retrofitting of buildings at risk of future damage. This work should be specified and the costs estimated as well.

Numerous critical activities can be initiated once the housing assessment has been conducted, the results analyzed, recommended DRM measures identified, and cost estimates made. These include, among others:

• decisions regarding the reconstruction approach that government will promote, and the need for relocation and for transitional shelter options to be provided;
• design of the financial assistance strategy;
• determination of technical assistance requirements for builders;
• design of the training program for builders and construction inspectors; and
• design of the communications plan related to the assistance program and DRR measures.

Chapter 16, Training Requirements in Reconstruction, explains how housing damage assessment data are used in developing training for builders.

The housing assessment process does not necessarily eliminate the need for individual homeowners to hire engineers and/or contractors to provide specifications and cost estimates for their specific reconstruction projects, particularly for engineered buildings.