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COMMENT

Chapter 14 International, National, and Local Partnerships in Reconstruction

Introduction Key Decisions Policies Technical Issues
Risks & Challenges
Recommendations Case Studies Resources
This Chapter Is Especially Useful For:
  • Policy makers
  • Lead disaster agency
  • Agencies involved in reconstruction
  • Project managers
 
Guiding Principles for Partnerships in Reconstruction
 
  • Partnerships between government and international, national, and local organizations are essential to successful reconstruction.
  • Partners that arrive later in the recovery period should respect the agreements that earlier-arriving partners made with government and affected communities before their arrival.
  • Negotiated rules should govern the collaboration between government, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), civil society organizations (CSOs), and affected communities in a reconstruction program. The Global Humanitarian Platform (GHP) “Principles of Partnership” should always be adhered to.
  • NGOs and CSOs are almost always more effective when working within their area of expertise and the limits of their capacity and resources.
  • Governments have the right and responsibility to require that NGOs and CSOs follow ground rules, conform to the reconstruction policy, and report regularly on their activities.
  • The terms of partnerships between NGOs, CSOs, affected communities, and government should be concretely defined and formalized in writing.
  • Regular reporting by partners, and monitoring and evaluation by government and affected communities, can improve the results of NGO and CSO partnerships.
 
No single organization or category of organization can provide the institutional, human, technical, and financial resources needed to carry out a successful post-disaster reconstruction program. Collaboration among these organizations is key to successful post-disaster housing and community reconstruction.

The roles of various agencies in reconstruction are discussed in Chapter 1, Early Recovery: The Context for Housing and Community Reconstruction, with a focus on the chronology of their activities. That chapter also provides an overview of how the reconstruction process is likely to play out. This chapter focuses on the mechanics of collaboration among organizations. It provides information to help distinguish the types of organizations and their motivations, and practical advice on ensuring that the interventions of these organizations are planned, coordinated, and carried out in a systematic way, consistent with the reconstruction policy.

  1. Government should decide on the lead agency or individual to work with the United Nations (UN) Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) to agree on the involvement of the UN in the disaster response.
  2. The lead disaster agency or other designee should work with the UN HC to decide on the role of the UN agencies, including whether the cluster system will be activated, and, if so, in which sectors.
  3. The lead disaster agency, in consultation with affected communities, should agree with partners on the parameters for NGO and CSO involvement in response and reconstruction.
  4. The lead disaster agency should decide whether a registration process will be required for NGOs and CSOs involved in reconstruction and should agree with them on the coordination mechanisms and reporting procedures to be used.
  5. Partners should decide, in consultation with government, on the coordination mechanisms they will use among themselves.
  6. The lead disaster agency, partners, and the affected communities should jointly decide on the system and the benchmarks to be used for monitoring the participation of partners in reconstruction, at the national and community levels.
Through their participation in the UN System, governments have the services and support of the UN available to them in a post-disaster situation. Good coordination by government with the UN HC and the Humanitarian Country Team will help ensure the effectiveness of the UN response.

The role of NGOs and CSOs in response and reconstruction will vary from country to country, as will the legal framework under which these organizations operate. In general, laws are in place that require the registration of local and international NGOs, and of some types of CSOs as well, and these laws should be adhered to in the post-disaster context. Legal requirements often increase in proportion to the size of the organization, with larger organizations being required to disclose their financial operations in a manner similar to private firms.

Registration of CSOs and NGOs helps ensure that government is aware of their presence and allows government to monitor their activities, although registration rules should not be so strict as to discourage needed interventions. The proliferation of partners is a risk in recovery and reconstruction, so governments may need to expand registration requirements to require participation in coordination mechanisms and additional forms of reporting by these organizations.

Since the late 1980s, as international organizations have strengthened their commitment to lessening the impact of natural disasters worldwide through disaster risk reduction (DRR) and to improving their response to disasters, they have also worked to improve the quality and to expand the extent of their collaboration. These efforts are contributing to several important goals, including improved international disaster response, increased funding for DRR research and policy development, expanded DRR efforts at the national level, and strengthened interinstitutional cooperation. This section briefly reviews some of the most important interagency agreements and collaborations, most of which the World Bank participates in. It also highlights how the work of these entities relates to post-disaster housing and community reconstruction.
 
European Commission/World Bank/UN Joint Declaration
In September 2008, the European Commission, the UN, and the World Bank signed the Joint Declaration on Post-Crisis Assessments and Recovery Planning, which addresses coordination mechanisms for both post-conflict and post-disaster situations.[1] This declaration commits the signatories to:
  • Communicate strategically at both headquarters and field levels as we monitor situations of fragility and conflict, and imminent or actual natural disasters, and identify opportunities for joint initiatives where our combined efforts may offer advantages.
  • Participate in the relevant in-country planning processes and support the development and use of shared benchmarks/results frameworks and joint processes for monitoring and review.
  • Support the development and use of the common methodologies for post-conflict needs assessments, and a common approach to post-disaster needs assessments and recovery planning.
  • Invest in development of toolkits and staff training to deepen collective and institutional capacity for these processes.
  • Monitor progress in the implementation of the common platform through a senior level meeting that would take place once a year.

The activities under this declaration related to the convergence of assessment methodologies are described in Chapter 2, Assessing Damage and Setting Reconstruction Policy.

Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery
The Bank’s activities in the Joint Declaration with respect to natural disasters are coordinated by the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR).[2]Launched in 2006, the GFDRR is a partnership of the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction system to support the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015 (HFA).[3] The mission of the GFDRR, which is managed by the World Bank on behalf of the participating donor partners and other partner stakeholders, is to reduce vulnerabilities to natural hazards by mainstreaming disaster reduction and climate change adaptation in country development strategies.
 
The Global Humanitarian Platform
The GHP is a forum that was created in 2006 to bring together the three main components of the humanitarian community—NGOs, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and the UN and related international organizations.[4] The goal of the GHP is to enhance the effectiveness of humanitarian action. The founding premise of the GHP is that no single humanitarian agency can cover all humanitarian needs and that collaboration is, therefore, not an option, but a necessity.

Based on the principle of diversity, the GHP does not seek to convince humanitarian agencies to pursue a single mode of action or work within a unique framework. The GHP aims at maximizing complementarity based on the participating organizations’ different mandates and missions, and emphasizes the importance of coordinating with and integrating local organizations, such as local NGOs and CSOs, in humanitarian response.

The organizations participating in the GHP have agreed to the following “Principles of Partnership”[5] as the basis of their collective action.

Principles of Partnership
Principle
Explanation

Equality

Equality requires mutual respect between members of the partnership irrespective of size and power. The participants must respect each other’s mandates, obligations, independence, and brand identity and recognize each other’s constraints and commitments. Mutual respect must not preclude organizations from engaging in constructive dissent.

Transparency

Transparency is achieved through dialogue (on equal footing), with an emphasis on early consultations and early sharing of information. Communications and transparency, including financial transparency, increase the level of trust among organizations.
Result-oriented approach
Effective humanitarian action must be reality-based and action-oriented. This requires result-oriented coordination based on effective capabilities and concrete operational capacities.

Responsibility

Humanitarian organizations have an ethical obligation to each other to accomplish their tasks responsibly, with integrity and in a relevant and appropriate way. They must make sure they commit to activities only when they have the means, competencies, skills, and capacity to deliver on their commitments. Decisive and robust prevention of abuses committed by humanitarians must also be a constant effort.

Complementarity

The diversity of the humanitarian community is an asset if we build on our comparative advantages and complement each other’s contributions. Local capacity is one of the main assets to enhance and on which to build. Whenever possible, humanitarian organizations should strive to make it an integral part in emergency response. Language and cultural barriers must be overcome.
Key International, National, and Local Partner Institutions and Their Roles
The Inter-Agency Standing Committee. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) is an interagency forum for coordination, policy development, and decision making involving key UN and non-UN partners.[6] It develops humanitarian policies, agrees on clear divisions of responsibilities for the various aspects of humanitarian assistance, identifies and addresses gaps in response, and advocates for effective application of humanitarian principles. Together with the Executive Committee for Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA), the IASC forms the key strategic coordination mechanism among major humanitarian actors in a disaster situation. Its Full Members include, among others, the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT). Its Standing Invitees include, among others, the World Bank, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC), the American Council for Voluntary International Action (InterAction), and the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).

The IASC contributes to the post-disaster shelter field largely through the Emergency Shelter Cluster (ESC). Recently, the IASC and UN-HABITAT produced the 2008 edition of “Shelter Projects,” which monitors post-disaster emergency and transitional shelter projects,[7] and published the guidebook, “NFIs for Shelter,”[8] discussed in Chapter 15, Mobilizing Financial Resources and Other Reconstruction Assistance.

IASC Global Cluster Leads. In December 2005, the IASC Principals designated global CLs for nine sectors or areas of activity where in the past either there was a lack of predictable leadership in situations of humanitarian emergency or there was considered to be a need to strengthen leadership and partnership with other humanitarian actors (see below). This nine sectors/areas complement those sectors and categories of population where leadership and accountability are already clear, e.g. agriculture (led by FAO), food (led by WFP), refugees (led by UNHCR) and education (led by UNICEF).

The Global Cluster Leads
Sector or Area of Activity
Global Cluster Lead
Camp Coordination/Management: IDPs (from conflict)
                                                 Disaster situations
UNHCR
IOM
Early Recovery
UNDP
Emergency Shelter: IDPs (from conflict)  
                            Disaster situations
UNHCR
IFRC (Convener)
Emergency Telecommunications
OCHA/UNICEF/WFP
Health
WHO
Logistics
WFP
Nutrition
UNICEF
Protection: IDPs (from conflict)
                 Disasters/civilians affected by conflict (other than IDPs)*
UNHCR
UNHCR/OHCHR/UNICEF
Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
UNICEF
* UNHCR is the CL of the global Protection Cluster. However, at the country level in disaster situations or in complex emergencies without significant displacement, the three core protection-mandated agencies (UNHCR, UNICEF, and OHCHR) consult closely and, under the overall leadership of the HC/RC, agree which of the three will assume the role of CL for Protection.

Emergency Shelter Cluster. The ESC is co-chaired by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and IFRC. UNHCR leads the ESC in the area of conflict-generated internally displaced persons (IDPs), while the IFRC is convener of the ESC in disaster situations. [9] The main partners in the ESC are UN-HABITAT, UN OCHA, the Norwegian Refugee Council, Oxfam International, Care International, CHF International, Shelter Centre, the International Organization for Migration, the United Nation Children’s Fund (UNICEF), UNDP, the World Food Programme (WFP), the Danish Refugee Council, and any NGO involved in emergency shelter. Decisions made in the ESC set the stage for later housing and community reconstruction activities, as explained in Chapter 1, Early Recovery: The Context for Housing and Community Reconstruction, and are therefore important to agencies involved in reconstruction, including the World Bank.

The IFRC acts as a “convener” rather than a CL for emergency shelter. In that capacity, it has made a commitment to provide leadership to the broader humanitarian community in emergency shelter in disaster situations, to consolidate best practices, to map capacity and gaps, and to lead a coordinated response. It does not act as the “provider of last resort,” as do other CLs, nor is it accountable to any part of the UN System. The IFRC also does not participate in Consolidated Appeals launched by the UN, but instead appeals separately for support in providing leadership and strengthening capacity for the provision of emergency shelter in disasters resulting from natural hazards.

The UN System. The UN System supports disaster prevention, response, and reconstruction through a number of its component agencies and organizations.

The International Strategy for Disaster Reduction. The ISDR is a system of partnerships with the overall objective to generate and support a global disaster risk reduction movement to implement HFA. The ISDR was endorsed by the World Conference on Disaster Reduction in 2004 and by the UN General Assembly and serves as the overall framework for implementing disaster risk reduction at the local, national, regional, and international levels. The ISDR is partner to the World Bank in the GFDRR. The secretariat to ISDR is UNISDR, an entity within the UN Secretariat.

Two other agencies whose roles are especially important in housing and community reconstruction are the UN OCHA and the Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery (CWGER).

The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. UN OCHA supports and facilitates the work of UN agencies, NGOs, and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement in delivering humanitarian services. It works closely with governments to support them in their lead role in humanitarian response. UN OCHA supports the UN HC in needs assessments, contingency planning, and formulation of humanitarian programs. The head of UN OCHA, as Emergency Relief Coordinator, chairs the IASC, which comprises all major humanitarian actors, including the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and three NGO consortiums.

UN OCHA deploys staff to disaster areas on short notice and supports several “surge capacity” mechanisms, including the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination System (UNDAC), which can dispatch teams within 24 hours of a natural disaster to gather information, assess needs, and coordinate international assistance.

UN OCHA also solicits donor support through the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP); issues emergency appeals on behalf of countries affected by disasters; and manages the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), which enables UN agencies to jump-start relief activities following natural disasters. UN OCHA also leads various activities to improve information flow in disasters, including managing humanitarian information centers in the field (as described in Chapter 17, Information and Communications Technology in Reconstruction) and running ReliefWeb, the “global hub for time-critical humanitarian information on complex emergencies and natural disasters.”[10]

While UN OCHA’s work is not principally shelter-related, it contributes to the advancement of good practices on post-disaster emergency and transitional shelter, for instance, through its collaboration with the Shelter Centre on the development of the guidelines Shelter After Disaster: Strategies for Transitional Settlement and Reconstruction.[11]

The Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery. UNDP coordinates the CWGER, one element of the UN reform agenda. The CWGER is intended to strengthen humanitarian response capacity and effectiveness. [12] It operates at the global level to strengthen preparedness and technical capacity by designating “Cluster Leads” (CLs) that ensure leadership and accountability in sectors or areas of activity. At the country level, the CWGER ensures a more coherent and effective response by mobilizing international agencies, organizations, and NGOs in all key sectors under the UN HC and the Humanitarian Country Team. The CWGER has also worked to establish a clearer division of labor among organizations and to define roles and responsibilities within sectors. It also acts for the UN HC as the first point of call and the “provider of last resort” in all sectors or areas of activity.[13] The key actors in the cluster system are explained in the following table.

Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC)
The ERC is the undersecretary general for humanitarian affairs, who also heads OCHA. The ERC ensures that an agreement is reached on country-level cluster/sector leads and that this decision is communicated to humanitarian partners, donors, and other stakeholders. (The UN HC informs the host government and country-level humanitarian partners of the agreed arrangements.)
Humanitarian Coordinator
The HC (or Resident Coordinator [RC] where an HC has not yet been appointed) is the most senior UN humanitarian official on the ground for an emergency. This person ensures the adequacy, coherence, and effectiveness of the overall humanitarian response and is accountable to the ERC. With the Humanitarian Country Team, the HC establishes coordination mechanisms and is responsible for adapting them to reflect government capability.
Cluster Leads
The CLs (sometimes referred to as Sector Leads)[14] support government coordination and response efforts, facilitate coordination between cluster partners within a given sector and between different sectors, encourage collaboration, ensure that responses adhere to existing guidelines and standards, collate and share information, identify response gaps and duplication, and act as provider of last resort. Sector/cluster lead agencies are accountable to the UN HC.
Nongovernmental Organizations
Defining “nongovernmental organization.” An NGO is any nonprofit, voluntary citizens’ group organized on a local, national, or international level. Generally outcome-oriented and driven by people with a common interest, NGOs perform a variety of service and humanitarian functions, bring citizen concerns to governments, advocate and monitor policies, and encourage political participation through organizing and providing information. Some are organized around specific issues, such as human rights, environment, or health. They provide analysis and expertise, serve as early warning mechanisms, and help monitor and implement international agreements. International, national, and local NGOs carry out work related to disaster response and recovery.

The legal form of NGOs is diverse and depends on variations in countries’ laws and practices. However, there are four main groups of NGOs generally recognized worldwide[15]:

  • Trusts, charities, and foundations
  • Not-for-profit companies
  • Unincorporated and voluntary associations
  • Entities formed or registered under special NGO or nonprofit laws

The Asian Development Bank characterizes NGOs according to whether their principal focus is operational or advocacy, believing that this distinction is key to determining the type of interaction the Bank can have with them: operational cooperation and collaboration versus policy dialogue.[16] Yet the Bank acknowledges that in many cases it is not possible to characterize an NGO entirely as purely operational or advocacy, since some are involved in both types of activities. The two groups have the following characteristics.

Operational NGOs
  • Primary areas of activity are directed toward the contribution or delivery of development or welfare services, including emergency relief, and environmental protection and management.
  • Display a range of programs, organizational structures, operational orientations, and areas of operation, both program-related and geographical.
  • Exist at all levels: community, local, district, national, regional, and international.
 
Advocacy NGOs
  • Primary orientation is advocacy of policies or actions that address specific concerns, points of view, or interests.
  • Work to influence the policies and practices of governments, development institutions, other actors in the development arena, and the public.
  • Exist more often at national and international levels, and increasingly are forming national and international networks and consortia that link groups with parallel or convergent interests.
  • Exist to serve as a voice that they consider otherwise would not be heard in social, economic, and political processes.

In Gujarat after the 2001 earthquake, Kutch Nav Nirman Abhiyan, a coalition of 14 NGOs, worked alongside the Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority (GSDMA) in 600 earthquake-affected villages and towns to encourage civic participation in reconstruction, as described in the case study, below.

International NGOs. International NGOs include high-profile humanitarian actors who play an extremely important role in disaster response and recovery. As international entities, they may not be organized under or subject to national law; however, a number of international NGOs operate as networks of national organizations, each of which is subject to the national laws that govern the formation and obligations of nongovernmental corporations in the respective country. International NGOs act individually and collectively to mobilize financial, technical, and human resources after disasters, and work as peers with the UN in such initiatives as the GHP, discussed above. Major international NGOs include the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, CARE International, Mercy Corps, Oxfam International, Plan International, World Vision International, Save the Children Alliance, Food for the Hungry, Amnesty International, Caritas International, Doctors Without Borders, International Rescue Committee, and Habitat for Humanity International.

International NGOs are often the first international agencies to mobilize after a disaster. Because of their experience at quickly establishing a presence in-country and in the disaster area (or expanding a presence they already have), they often assist government in conducting initial post-disaster assessments and in designing and putting in motion the early stages of the response, as described in Chapter 1, Early Recovery: The Context for Housing and Community Reconstruction. For these reasons, international NGOs will often have a grasp of the situation on the ground—second only to that of government.

The case study on Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, below, shows an example of where two international NGOs, Habitat for Humanity International and Church World Service, worked with 53 local community-based organizations (CBOs) to assist affected families with repair and reconstruction activities.

Civil Society Organizations
Defining “civil society organization.” This handbook uses the phrase “civil society organization” as a generic term to refer to the wide array of national and local nongovernmental and not-for-profit organizations that express the interests and values of their members and/or others based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious, or philanthropic considerations.[17]The application of the phrases “nongovernmental organization” and “civil society organization” varies from one country to another. Many of the points made here about CSOs apply equally to NGOs. See Chapter 12, Community Organizing and Participation, for a discussion of the ways in which affected individuals, communities, and CBOs participate in reconstruction.

The private sector directly carries out reconstruction in myriad ways, but may also do so through a CSO, such as an association of firms in a single industry or of professionals with a particular expertise, such as engineering or communications.[18]DHL is one private firm that directly contributes services worldwide after disasters, providing logistical services in airports to manage relief supplies, as shown in the case study, below.

CSOs carry out uncoerced collective actions around shared interests, purposes, and values. In theory, civil society is distinct from the state, the family, and the market. In practice, the boundaries between them can be indistinct. CSOs differ in their levels of formality, autonomy, power, and reach.[19] While most civil society activity remains local, over the decades CSOs have worked collectively to shape global policy through advocacy campaigns and the mobilization of people and resources.

In the World Bank, there has been a deliberate shift away from use of the term “NGO”—due to its more narrow application to professional, intermediary, and nonprofit organizations that advocate and/or provide services—toward the term “CSO.” This reflects the Bank’s effort to reach out to a broader group of organizations that includes not just NGOs, but also trade unions, community-based organizations, social movements, faith-based institutions, charitable organizations, universities, foundations, professional associations, and others. This broader group is also likely to be active in post-disaster reconstruction.

Types of CSOs. CSOs are categorized by their objectives, geography, and funding. The World Bank classifies a CSO according to whether its mission is charitable, service-oriented, participatory, or devoted to community empowerment.

CSOs can also be classified geographically as local, national, or international, although—as mentioned above—this handbook refers to international NGOs and national organizations associated with international NGOs as NGOs, rather than CSOs. In post-disaster situations, it is important to know if a CSO is already working in a disaster area and therefore has local knowledge. Both local and international organizations can have local knowledge. CSOs can be grouped in many ways. A useful typology proposed by the World Bank for selecting CSOs for consultation processes is shown below.

 

Typology of Civil Society Organizations[20]
Functions
Category examples
Implications for selection criteria and process

Representation

  • Membership organizations, including labor unions, women’s associations, peasant organizations
  • NGOs, federations, umbrella organizations, or networks
  • Faith-based organizations
  • Organizations of indigenous peoples
  • The selection of these organizations should be based on the size and type of the organization and the legitimacy of representation. Questions that can help classify the organization include:
  • Who belongs to the organization?
  • What are the criteria for membership?
  • In what activities does the organization engage?
  • Does it cater to members only, or does it take up action on behalf of a wider group?
  • What is the geographic and sectoral coverage of the organization?

Technical expertise

  • Professional and business associations
  • Think tanks and other research groups
The selection should be based on the expertise and knowledge of issues and the legitimacy of members’ expertise.

Advocacy

  • Trade unions
  • NGOs
  • Human rights groups
  • News and media groups
  • Campaign organizations
The selection should be based on how actively a group is advocating issues, its capacity to mobilize and educate a constituency, its credibility, and its demonstrated interest in constructive engagement.

Capacity building

  • Foundations (local, international, and community)
  • CSO support organizations
  • Training organizations
The selection should be based on the issues associated with a proposed project or strategy under study. An organization may represent a key interlocutor that strengthens the capacity of civil society to participate in the consultation.
Service delivery
  • Local, national, and international NGOs
  • Credit and mutual aid societies
  • Informal, grassroots, and community-based associations
The selection should be based on the relation of these issues to a proposed project. Issues of representation may also come into play for some of these groups.
Role of CSOs in reconstruction. CSOs can play a central role in post-disaster reconstruction. They bring institutional, human, technical, social, and financial resources to reconstruction and—being local—can link reconstruction efforts to longer-term sustainable development activities in a disaster-affected region. However, the role and influence of CSOs in the disaster context varies considerably, depending on their scale, sponsoring organization, financial strength, purpose, and geographic reach. A list of common roles includes:
  • providing humanitarian, technical, manpower, material, advisory, scientific, and financial assistance to government or directly to the affected population in all phases of the reconstruction cycle;
  • influencing reconstruction policy, especially when acting collectively;
  • advocating for equity, human rights, transparency, accountability, and justice in the reconstruction process; and
  • coordinating and communicating between government, local people, and national and international organizations.

The case study on the Shelter Advisory Group in Tamil Nadu, below, describes a unique case where a multidisciplinary public-private partnership was formed to provide quality control over the work of NGOs involved in reconstruction. After Hurricane Katrina, a group of universities collaborated with citizens to develop a revitalization plan for the 9th Ward of New Orleans, as described in the case study, below.

Challenges in Collaborating with NGOs and CSOs
Need for systematic approach. Numerous post-disaster evaluations point out the risks of ignoring or not establishing ground rules for the work of NGOs and CSOs in reconstruction. Evaluations of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami response represent an extreme, although not unique, case.[21] The effective use of the resources that these organizations bring to reconstruction—institutional, human, technical, social, and financial—requires a planned approach. In outlining the reconstruction strategy, it is necessary to identify the role these organizations will play. Government should also manage competition among NGOs and CSOs by setting rules for their involvement in reconstruction; requiring information sharing; and establishing mechanisms for reporting, coordination, and monitoring of their activities. Transparency and public participation are hallmarks of some, but not all NGOs; government may need to establish standards for community participation and information disclosure. The role foreseen for NGOs and CSOs in reconstruction should be laid out in government’s reconstruction policy. A description of the scope of the reconstruction policy is included in Chapter 2, Assessing Damage and Setting Reconstruction Policy.

After the 2003 Bam earthquake, government turned to UN OCHA and UNDP to coordinate the work of international NGOs, which included an effort to more equitably allocate their support between rural and urban areas, as described in the case study, below.

Organizational agendas versus government goals. NGOs and CSOs sometimes bring their own agendas to the reconstruction context, and their goals may not reflect government policy objectives. These agendas may include promoting a political or religious ideology. Agencies have been known to exclude beneficiaries who do not share specific religious or philosophical beliefs. Organizational agendas are influenced by the source of NGO or CSO funding in at least two respects: the need to show results to funders may sometimes cloud the judgment of organizations, and the funders may insist on specific approaches that reflect their values.[22] Government must be on guard for discriminatory practices and ensure that CSOs and NGOs are willing to align their activities with reconstruction policies. Government outreach, clear communication of objectives and conditions for NGO and CSO participation, and interagency coordination mechanisms can all help unify criteria, standards, and modalities of assistance.

Capacity limits and need for strengthening. One concern about the way CSOs operate is that they can take on too much responsibility at too large a scale with insufficient funding. Where government is funding NGO or CSO activities, funding should be calibrated to organizational capacity. Government review of CSO project initiatives can help detect in advance possible problems with their proposed activities. At the same time, government should not overlook the expertise of local CSOs or allow international NGOs to overshadow their local counterparts. Local academic institutions, professional organizations, and licensing authorities are examples of CSOs that can play a critical role in post-disaster reconstruction. Institutional strengthening or other support may be necessary if a CSO’s capacity is taxed by its participation in the reconstruction effort.

Formalizing Government/NGO/CSO Collaboration
Assessing NGOs and CSOs. In working with NGOs and CSOs, government must establish their legitimacy and confirm their capacity. CSOs are generally most effective working within their established area of expertise in activities that will not overtax their capacity. Assessments may be needed to identify organizations’ constituency, capacity, outreach capacity, and technical skills.

A formal registration system may also be necessary, especially for international NGOs entering the country for the first time after a disaster to provide services. At a minimum, a registration or tracking system should ensure that CSOs are duly registered in their own countries; have the experience to carry out legitimate, needed activities in a professional manner; are not imposing a particular philosophy or religion on the affected population as a condition for services; and are able and willing to report on their activities and the financial resources under their control. Listed below is information government should consider requesting of NGOs and CSOs involved in reconstruction.

Data for NGO/CSO Registration System
Data
Purpose
Name
Legal name and doing-business-as name, internationally and locally.

Legal status

National or international organization. Type of incorporation or other legal status. Legal basis for receiving funds from international and/or national sources. Permission to operate in the country.

Experience

Experience in the affected country and/or region and in similar post-disaster reconstruction activities. Supervisory structure, and experience of senior officials.
Expertise
Principal services: financial, technical assistance, human resources. Language skills of staff. Systems for project management.
Beneficiary screening criteria
Screening criteria for beneficiaries, especially philosophical or religious preconditions, if any.
Financial capacity
Financial management capacity. Availability and source of own funds. Experience with managing government and other outside funds. Ability to present accurate and timely financial information.
Institutional contacts
Headquarters and institutional information, including names of senior management and board members.
Contact information
Location of office, telephone, fax, Web site, e-mail address.

Formalizing the NGO/CSO role. It is advisable that governments collaborating formally with NGOs and CSOs in reconstruction activities define the terms of the partnership with written agreements or contracts. For CSOs in particular, the community contract model promoted by UN-HABITAT may be a useful resource for drafting these agreements.[23] In other cases, normal contracting frameworks used in government procurement can be applied. The agreement should define expected outcomes and benchmarks, establish financial disclosure and monitoring requirements, and define sanctions in the event there is nonperformance of obligations under the contract.

Oversight system. Delegating certain duties does not absolve government from its oversight responsibilities. Government monitoring is necessary to ensure that NGO and CSO partners adhere to established reconstruction guidelines and parameters. A government agency should be assigned by the lead disaster agency to coordinate the work of the NGOs and CSOs and to monitor their performance. The World Bank’s good practice notes on involving NGOs in Bank-supported activities may be useful in this context.[24] Reporting by organizations should reference benchmarks, outputs, and outcomes, and cover both programmatic and administrative expenditures. Reporting should include an accounting of any counterpart contributions made by the CSO, government, or the affected community and families.

Start-up and periodic meetings are useful tools for raising issues, reviewing resource requirements, and negotiating adjustments in prior estimates of inputs or outcomes. Governments often request that NGOs establish and manage the coordination system in which government then participates. In those cases where NGOs and CSOs are directly supporting participatory reconstruction projects in communities, government should have procedures for consulting regularly with communities and families about their satisfaction with the services they are receiving. In cases where NGO presence in the country is only temporary, government may require a continuity plan to ensure the sustainability of the activities that NGOs initiated. A successful south-south partnership (i.e., a partnership between developing country organizations) that took place following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami in Aceh, between a local coalition of NGOs and the Indian coalition Kutch Nav Nirman Abhiyan, is described in the case study, below.

  • Government allows the UN or other partners to establish reconstruction policy.
  • The support of the cluster system could be useful, but it is not activated or is activated too late to be effective.
  • NGOs and CSOs proliferate after a disaster and government fails to set standards or financing limits or to coordinate their activities.
  • NGOs and CSOs overstate their capacity, receive more funding than they are capable of managing, or make commitments to affected communities that they cannot fulfill.
  • NGOs and CSOs conduct their work in a nonconsultative, top-down manner, working on a turnkey basis to deliver finished products to “beneficiaries.”
  • NGOs and CSOs require that community members conform to an organizational agenda, including those of a religious nature, in order to qualify for the benefit being offered.
  • Government does not require alignment of CSO or NGO activities with reconstruction policy or the disclosure of reconstruction outputs and financial results.
  • NGOs and CSOs pretend they represent the community instead of supporting the articulation of community preferences.
 
Recommendations
  1. Government should request whatever support it needs from the UN or other partners to define reconstruction policy and implement the reconstruction program, while maintaining overall coordination of the process.
  2. In developing a reconstruction program, identify the roles best suited to the UN, other humanitarian agencies, NGOs, and CSOs, and deploy partner resources based on an assessment of their experience, ability to execute, local knowledge, and financial capacity.
  3. Ensure that a CSO’s role in the reconstruction process is consistent with the organization’s established mandate.
  4. Create a reporting mechanism to monitor CSO project design, development, and implementation activities.
  5. When needed to ensure their involvement, provide technical, financial, and implementation support to local CSO initiatives.
  6. When NGOs or CSOs are engaged by government to carry out specific activities, calibrate funding to organizational capacity, formalize programmatic relationships, and establish benchmarks for program activities.
  7. Establish a monitoring and evaluation system for all NGO and CSO activity and mechanisms for keeping track of the satisfaction of the population being served.
2001 Gujarat Earthquake, India
Kutch Nav Nirman Abhiyan Empowers Villages through Mediation with Official Bodies

The Kutch Nav Nirman Abhiyan, a coalition of 14 grassroots NGOs formed in the aftermath of the June 1998 Kandla cyclone, was widely praised for its role in post-disaster relief and rehabilitation following the 2001 Gujarat earthquake that killed or injured more than 26,000 people in India’s Kutch District. With the GSDMA retaining ultimate authority, Abhiyan worked in 600 earthquake-affected villages and towns in the Kutch District’s wide geographical expanse to bring civic engagement to the reconstruction process, complementing GSDMA’s knowledge with its in-depth knowledge of the district. Abhiyan linked technical experts with illiterate villagers and worked to ensure reconstruction efforts addressed the best interests of the people. It did this by encouraging the formation of village committees to select partnering agencies in reconstruction (as a result, a number of agencies not considered to be working in the best interests of the community were rejected), helping villagers conduct damage and needs assessments, and forming committees to disseminate information on reconstruction packages and policies between villagers and government agencies and among the villages to ensure equity in reconstruction policy and implementation. It also successfully lobbied for policy measures that greatly improved transparency, accountability, and community involvement, and it convinced banks and government agencies to route reconstruction funds directly to beneficiaries through bank accounts.

Source: Lena Dominelli, 2007, Revitalising Communities in a Globalising World (Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.), http://www.ashgate.com/default.aspx?page=637&calctitle=1&pageSubject=471&pagecount=2&title_id=7729&edition_id=8762&lang=cy; and Abhiyan, http://www.kutchabhiyan.org.

2003 Bam Earthquake, Iran
Experience of Coordinating International NGOs Involved in Reconstruction         

At the time of the 2003 earthquake in Bam, Iran, the UN had not yet adopted the cluster approach to coordinate international aid after disasters. However, UN OCHA and UNDP set up a coordination mechanism to support the Iranian government’s management of reconstruction, including the coordination of international NGOs. As part of this effort, UNDP and the Housing Foundation of the Islamic Revolution (HF) coordinated activities in the shelter sector. UNDP organized an initial meeting that included government agencies, as well as the Iranian Red Crescent, UN-HABITAT, and the international NGOs, to discuss government’s shelter sector policies and its reconstruction approach.

As the recovery progressed, regular meetings continued in various sectors, including shelter. The international NGOs active in shelter provision in and around Bam before the earthquake were mostly working in rural areas, where reconstruction was faster and less complicated, than in urban areas, where detailed structure plans had to be respected and construction techniques were more complex. However, the damage from the Bam earthquake in urban areas was enormous (approximately 25,000 urban housing units were lost), so international NGOs were encouraged to diversify. The international NGOs built 3,200 replacement housing units after the Bam earthquake, 850 of which were in urban areas. The direct financial aid provided by international NGOs was between US$4,000 and US$7,000 per household. The population also had access to government grants and low-interest loans. (The World Bank also provided a US$220 million loan for reconstruction, a large part of which was used by the HF to purchase materials for housing reconstruction.) However, much of the added value of the international NGOs and UNDP during this time did not have to do with their financial assistance, but with their demonstration of participatory approaches in reconstruction and their support to the neediest groups within the affected population.

Sources: Victoria Kianpour, UNDP Iran, 2009, personal communication, http://www.undp.org.ir/; and World Bank, 2004, Technical Annex for a Proposed Loan of US$220 Million to the Islamic Republic of Iran for a Bam Earthquake Emergency Reconstruction Project, http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?pagePK=64283627&piPK=73230&theSitePK=40941&menuPK=228424&Projectid=P088060.

2005 Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans, United States
Universities Unite to Help Rebuild New Orleans

The ACORN Housing-University Collaborative was formed to assist in rebuilding New Orleans in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Cornell University, Columbia University, the Pratt Institute, New Jersey’s Science and Technology University, and Louisiana State University participated with ACORN. Four months after the hurricane, the collaborative issued “The People’s Plan for Overcoming the Hurricane Katrina Blues: A Comprehensive Strategy for Promoting a More Vibrant, Sustainable, and Equitable 9th Ward.” The plan was well received by all stakeholders in New Orleans. Residents considered it truly representative of their needs. It featured 56 immediate, short-term, and long-term revitalization measures to address all aspects of community revival, including social, economical, environmental, and physical planning issues. In March 2007, both the New Orleans City Planning Commission and the New Orleans City Council passed resolutions to incorporate the plan’s main elements into the comprehensive Unified New Orleans Plan. The plan can be viewed at http://www.rebuildingtheninth.org/resources/.

Source: Kenneth M. Reardon, Marcel Ionescu-Heroiu, and Andrew J. Rumbach, 2008, “Equity Planning in Post-Hurricane Katrina New Orleans: Lessons from the Ninth Ward,” http://www.huduser.org/periodicals/cityscpe/vol10num3/ch4.pdf.

2005-2007 Worldwide
Disaster Risk Teams Mobilized by Express and Logistics Giant DHL

In 2005, DHL and UN OCHA established a strategic partnership to deliver aid quickly to remote areas immediately following a catastrophe by overcoming transportation and logistics challenges. As part of its larger corporate responsibility program, DHL is working to establish a global network of Disaster Response Teams (DRTs) to reduce bottlenecks in airports close to natural disaster sites. DHL is the umbrella brand of Deutsche Post World Net, the world’s largest express and logistics company. Headquartered in Bonn, with 520,000 employees in more than 220 countries and territories worldwide, DHL has set up three DRTs worldwide. The first one is located in Singapore; the South Florida team covers Latin America and the Caribbean; and the most recent DRT base is DHL Express UAE in Dubai, which will cover the Middle East/Africa region. In the event of a major catastrophe, teams composed of specially trained DHL employees will help manage crucial logistics operations in airports close to the affected region, ensuring that relief supplies are efficiently sorted, stored, and distributed. The DRTs helped deliver some 4.77 million pounds of relief materials for post-tsunami and post-Hurricane Katrina relief operations. DHL and its DRTs will also support UNDP in its leadership role in reducing disaster risk and building capacities to reduce risk in countries worldwide through disaster preparedness and awareness.

Sources: UN OCHA, “United Nations Helps Launch DHL Disaster Response Team,” Press Release, May 31, 2006; UN OCHA, “Disaster Response Teams: An OCHA/DHL Partnership,” http://ochaonline.un.org/tabid/4777/Default.aspx; and DHL, 2007, “DHL Launches Disaster Response Team for Middle East/Africa,” Middle East Events (October 2007), http://www.middleeastevents.com/site/pres_dtls.asp?pid=2244.

2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, Tamil Nadu, India
Public-Private Partnerships for Safer Houses – The Shelter Advisory Group in Nagapattinam

Public-private partnerships were used with great success in Tamil Nadu during post-tsunami housing reconstruction, with government providing land, specifications, and infrastructure, and NGOs providing houses. About 20,000 houses had to be built in the district of Nagapattinam, and construction quality was a concern. Despite the recognized commitment of the NGOs, the pace of work necessitated regular monitoring and field-based support.

A unique entity, the NGO Coordination and Resource Center (NCRC) was created to coordinate the efforts of all the players in the worst-affected districts. A joint Construction Quality Audit was also launched, supported by the NCRC, the government of Tamil Nadu, and UNDP. The multidisciplinary Shelter Advisory Group (SAG) was established at the district level, chaired by the District Collector and headed by Prof. Shantha Kumar, Emeritus Professor at Indian Institute of Technology Chennai and the main author of the TN Technical Guidelines for disaster-resilient housing. The SAG was supported by the Shelter Support Group (SSG), a team of post-disaster construction specialists, who visited the sites every month and provided technical support. Creating a registry of construction laborers at the village level—and training them in disaster-resilient construction—created a trained workforce of about 200 masons and other laborers. The SSG also trained government architects, contractors, engineers, and the engineers’ association on integrating disaster risk reduction techniques into building practices. Based on contact with the field, the SSG provided the SAG with data on reconstruction progress, raised issues of concern, and made general recommendations. This information was discussed at monthly district-level “Construction Clinics” attended by SAG, SSG, and the NGOs. SAG advised the NGOs, individually and collectively, based on the feedback and concerns of the SSG. This system visibly improved construction; improved the flow of information; and proved that technocrats, bureaucrats, and implementers can work together with a common agenda and approach.

Source: C. V. Sankar, India National Disaster Management Authority, 2009, personal communication.

2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, Aceh, Indonesia
Successful South-South Partnership

Immediately after the news of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami reached the outside world, the overseas development agency of the Catholic Church in Germany, Misereor, realized that Urban Poor Linkage Indonesia (UPLINK), a national coalition of NGOs and CBOs that focuses on urban poor issues and Misereor’s most important partner in the Indonesia, lacked experience in post-disaster reconstruction and would require support if it were to respond. As a result, Misereor arranged a partnership between UPLINK and Kutch Nav Nirman Abhiyan, a network of NGOs from Gujarat, India, that aims to enhance communities’ resilience and disaster preparedness. Abhiyan had played a pivotal role in the 2001 post-earthquake reconstruction in Gujarat, India, through its community-driven approach to reconstruction and its advocacy efforts to avoid relocation. In Aceh, Abhiyan helped UPLINK with development of a project concept and design of an implementation strategy, and with overcoming challenges in implementation. Abhiyan was also charged with ensuring that the affected people would actively participate in the rehabilitation and reconstruction in Aceh in a way that reflected their needs and capacities. The partnership produced impressive results, including the reconstruction of more than 3,000 quality houses. With Abhiyan’s help, UPLINK was able to navigate the complexities of the recovery and reconstruction process while strengthening its own capacities. (The project won a 2008 Dubai Best Practices award as “Integrated People-Driven Reconstruction in Post-Tsunami Aceh.”) The relationship between these two like-minded organizations continued throughout most of the project implementation and extends beyond the collaboration in Aceh.

Source: Jennifer Duyne Barenstein et al., 2007, “People-Driven Reconstruction and Rehabilitation in Aceh. A review of UPLINK’s Concepts, Strategies and Achievement” (evaluation by World Habitat Research Center under contract to Misereor), World Habitat Research Center, http://www.worldhabitat.supsi.ch; and Profile Uplink Indonesia, http://uplink.or.id/homes/en/node/43.

2005 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, Gulf Coast, United States
CSOs Combine Forces to Carry Out Home Repair Program
 
Habitat for Humanity International (HFHI) and Church World Service (CWS) formed a partnership in April 2006 to assist low-income families with disaster recovery funds in areas heavily damaged by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita along the Gulf Coast. This 2-year grant program was a joint effort to provide local long-term recovery organizations (LTROs) with the funding to support affected families with the repair and reconstruction of their homes. These LTROs were composed of local community, faith-based, and voluntary agencies that were involved in disbursing available resources (gift-in-kind materials, volunteer labor, case management, and funding) to affected families with unmet needs remaining after receiving disaster assistance funds from primary sources, such as the federal government and the insurance market. One of the benefits of the project was that it allowed both HFHI and CWS to focus on their core areas of strength (new home construction and post-disaster community organizing, respectively), while increasing each other’s capacity to respond to the high level of need across the region within their normal models of program delivery. Like many of the other rebuilding projects under way during the same time period in the Gulf, there were some minor delays in completing repairs due to fluctuations in available volunteer and contract labor, which led to the original project timeline being extended an additional two months. At the end of the project, almost US$4 million had been disbursed by HFHI and CWS to 53 different LTROs, which resulted in the repair of approximately 697 homes.
 
Source: Giovanni Taylor-Peace, Habitat for Humanity International and Bonnie Vollmering, Church World Service, 2009, personal communication; and “Habitat for Humanity International, Gulf Recovery Effort,” https://www.habitat.org/gulfrecoveryeffort/default.aspx.
 
European Commission, United Nations Development Group, and World Bank. 2008. “Joint Declaration on Post-Crisis Assessments and Recovery Planning.” http://www.undg.org/docs/9419/trilateral-JD-on-post-crisis-assessments-final.pdf.

IASC. 2006. “Guidance Note on Using the Cluster Approach to Strengthen Humanitarian Response.” http://www.humanitarianreform.org/humanitarianreform/Portals/1/Resources%20&%20tools/IASCGUIDANCENOTECLUSTERAPPROACH.pdf.

UN OCHA. 2006. Exploring Key Changes and Developments in Post-Disaster Settlement, Shelter and Housing, 1982-2006. Scoping study to inform the revision of Shelter after Disaster: Guidelines for Assistance. New York: UN OCHA.

Scheper, Elisabeth, Arjuna Parakrama, and Smruti Patel. 2006. Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities. London: Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC). http://www.alnap.org/pool/files/capacities-final-report.pdf.

UNISDR. 2007. A Guide for Implementing the Hyogo Framework. Geneva: UN. http://www.unisdr.org/eng/hfa/docs/Words-into-action/Words-Into-Action.pdf.

UNISDR Platform for the Promotion of Early Warning. 2008. Private Sector Activities in Disaster Risk Reduction: Good Practices and Lessons Learned. Bonn: UN. http://www.preventionweb.net/english/professional/publications/v.php?id=7519.

UNISDR , World Bank, and World Economic Forum (WEF). 2008. Building Resilience to Natural Disasters: A Framework for Private Sector Engagement. Geneva: WEF. http://www.preventionweb.net/english/professional/publications/v.php?id=1392.

Wisner, Ben and Bruno Haghebaert. 2006. “State/Civil Society Relations in Disaster Risk Reduction.” Discussion paper for “Strengthening Global Collaboration in Disaster Risk Reduction.” Bangkok: ProVention Consortium Forum.

World Bank. 2000. “Involving Nongovernmental Organizations in Bank Supported Activities.” http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/EXTPOLICIES/EXTOPMANUAL/0,,contentMDK:20064711~menuPK:4564189~pagePK:64709096~piPK:64709108~theSitePK:502184,00.html.

World Bank, Civil Society Team. 2007. “Consultations with Civil Society: A Sourcebook (Working Document).” http://siteresources.worldbank.org/CSO/Resources/ConsultationsSourcebook_Feb2007.pdf.


[1]. European Commission, United Nations Development Group, and World Bank, 2008, “Joint Declaration on Post-Crisis Assessments and Recovery Planning,” http://www.undg.org/docs/9419/trilateral-JD-on-post-crisis-assessments-final.pdf.

[2]. Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery, http://www.gfdrr.org. As of late 2009, GFDRR partners include the governments of Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom; the European Commission; and the World Bank.

[3]. In January 2005, 168 governments adopted the HFA at the World Conference on Disaster Reduction held in Kobe, Hyogo, Japan. The HFA is a 10-year plan to make the world safer from natural hazards. Endorsed by the UN General Assembly in Resolution 60/195, the HFA is now the primary international agreement guiding DRR efforts.

[4]. Global Humanitarian Platform, http://www.globalhumanitarianplatform.org.

[9]. A variety of useful tools and guidelines on emergency shelter are available on the Emergency Shelter Cluster Web site, http://www.humanitarianreform.org/humanitarianreform/Default.aspx?tabid=77.

[10]. UN OCHA, “ReliefWeb,” http://www.reliefweb.int.

[11]. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) and Shelter Centre, 2010, Shelter After Disaster: Strategies for Transitional Settlement and Reconstruction (Geneva: UN OCHA).

[12]. UNDP, 2008, “UNDP Policy on Early Recovery,” http://www.undp.org/cpr/documents/Early_Recovery/er_policy.pdf.

[13]. The “provider of last resort” concept within the cluster system means that it is the responsibility of the CL to call on all relevant humanitarian partners to address any critical gaps in the post-disaster response. If the partners cannot meet a critical need, the CL, as “provider of last resort,” may need to fill the gap. If funds are not forthcoming for these activities, the CL is expected to work with the UN HC and donors to mobilize the necessary resources.

[14]. IASC, “Guidance Note on Using the Cluster Approach to Strengthen Humanitarian Response,” 2006. http://www.humanitarianreform.org/humanitarianreform/Portals/1/Resources%20&%20tools/IASCGUIDANCENOTECLUSTERAPPROACH.pdf.

[15]. Wikipedia, “Non-governmental organization,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-governmental_organization.

[16]. Asian Development Bank, 2009, “Nongovernmental Organizations and Civil Society,” http://www.adb.org/Documents/Policies/Cooperation_with_NGOs/ngo_sector.asp?p=coopngos.  

[17]. London School of Economics Centre for Civil Society, 2004, “What is civil society?” http://www.lse.ac.uk/ collections/CCS/what_is_civil_society.htm.   

[18]. A discussion of the essential role of the private sector in reconstruction is beyond the scope of this handbook. Some useful reference material on this topic is included in the Resources section, below.

[19]. London School of Economics Centre for Civil Society, 2004, “What is civil society?” http://www.lse.ac.uk/ collections/CCS/what_is_civil_society.htm.

[20]. World Bank, Civil Society Team, 2007, “Consultations with Civil Society: A Sourcebook (Working Document),” p. 64, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/CSO/Resources/ConsultationsSourcebook_Feb2007.pdf.

[21]. Elisabeth Scheper, Arjuna Parakrama, and Smruti Patel, 2006, Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities, London: Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC), http://www.alnap.org/pool/files/capacities-final-report.pdf.

[22]. For example, one NGO involved in the Hurricane Mitch reconstruction in Honduras was unwilling to address the housing needs of unwed mothers.

[23]. UN-HABITAT Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, n.d., “Community Contracts,” http://www.fukuoka.unhabitat.org/event/docs/EVN_081216172311.pdf.